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**THE ROLE OF MODERATE MUSLIMS IN COMBATING
VIOLENT JIHAD**

by

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December 2007

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THE ROLE OF MODERATE MUSLIMS IN COMBATING VIOLENT JIHAD

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ABSTRACT

There is a widespread belief that moderate Muslims can help fight against the Jihadis in the war on terror. This belief is based on the fact that the ideology of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda attracts a steady stream of recruits; and this ideology can only be fought by moderate Muslims. This study, however, demonstrates that in a situation of conflict, particularly one having religious overtones, moderates have a limited role to play, because violence perpetrated by radicals becomes too dominating a feature. Moderates can play their most useful role only after the state is able to contain the radicals and secure conditions that are congenial for views different from those of radicals to be expressed.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The role of the U.S. military proved decisive in two World Wars. The nation's economic might and its liberal value system helped it sustain and then finally overcome four and half decades of cold war with the Soviet Union. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has brought the nation back into active conflict – this time with Jihadists. The new enemy is neither economically well developed as was Germany nor a military superpower like the Soviet Union. Yet, the Jihadists are proving to be, arguably, more formidable than either the Nazis or the Soviets.

The new enemy does not follow the written or unwritten rules of war (Cronin, 2004: p. 4). The terrorists and their sponsoring states do not hesitate to kill innocent civilians, tourists, women, and children or to take them hostage, then bargain for the release of murderers and criminals. These Jihadists have sleeper cells embedded in civil society, waiting to hit at the first opportunity, rather than a regular army. They are also motivated by as fascist an ideology as the Nazis – namely, purifying Islam of impurities contracted from outside influences, particularly those from the 'evil west', establishment of Islamic rule of 7th century kind (Woodward, nd), and the re-establishment of the glory and dominance of Islam (Romney, 2007). The 9/11 attacks were carried out by Islamist zealots determined to establish the supremacy of Islam. In pursuit of their objectives these Jihadists do not hesitate to kill even their fellow Muslims who do not toe their line or ideology.

The U.S. and its allies have declared war against the terror unleashed by the Jihadis, adopting the strategy of confronting the enemy head on using military power. The military response to counter-terrorism has proved inadequate, however. The military success in Afghanistan is proving to be short lived and the invasion of Iraq and its democratization has become a 'fiasco' (Ricks, 2006). The increase in terrorist incidents since the Iraq invasion has underscored the limitations in countering terrorism militarily. The war against terrorism, particularly Islamist terrorism, cannot be won only by military or 'law and order' means (Hassan, 2006).

It is widely acknowledged that the global war against terror has to be fought on all fronts, including the ideological front (Habeck, 2006, p. 172), since the present war with Islamists is a war for winning over Muslim minds (Kepel, 2004). The purpose of the 9/11 attacks was not only to terrorize the American public, but to win the support of Muslims for the Islamists' cause (Habeck, 2006, p. 14) and to galvanize the Ummah with an example of victory by violence (Kepel, 2004).

If the war has to be fought on an ideological front, it has to be 'believers' who fight it. Non-believers have no chance of winning the ideological battle with the Jihadis. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a well known Islamic Scholar believes that a time has come for Muslims to take a critical look at their own tradition and system of belief to see if these are the source of the terrorism being propagated by Al Qaeda and other Muslim organizations (El Fadl, 2007, p. 4). Commenting on the 'cartoon controversy' and the violence and intimidation that followed in its aftermath, KPS Gill (2006), the super cop from India - who is credited with successfully ending the militancy in Punjab - has opined that Muslims themselves have to stop tolerating the growing intolerance amongst Muslims. In other words, moderates among the Muslims have to bring about reforms within the Islamic community. Kepel (2004) has suggested that Muslim minds can be won over by moderate segments of the Muslim population, particularly European Muslims who have experienced the benefits of western liberal society. Kepel has observed that, contrary to popular perceptions, Muslims in Europe, particularly France, are integrating into the mainstream population; it is not uncommon to see Muslim men marrying French women and vice versa.

However, William W Finan Jr. (2007) does not agree with Kepel. He recognizes that radicalization of Muslims in Europe is on the rise as a result not only of marginalization of Muslims in the west, but also as a result of what is happening in the countries from which they have migrated. Even 3rd or 4th generations Muslims have not integrated fully. The Open Society Institute, in its report entitled "The Situation of Muslims in the UK," points out that Muslims have not integrated into the UK despite living there for two or three generations. The failure to integrate is not only because of discrimination and deprivation, but also because of Muslims' lack of a sense that they

belong to the broader society. This is based on the cultural disparity between where they have come from and the new environment. Their sense of being different and coming from a superior culture is kept alive by the mosques, which such people visit (Tillman, 2007).

Further, some scholars see the present violent Jihad as a conflict between the west and Islam (Huntington 1996, Clash of Civilization), in which the moderate Islamist will have little role to play for he would soon be sidelined for aligning with the crusaders and infidels. Simons (2006) has argued that though moderate Muslims can invoke the numerous religious edicts in Islam that favor moderation, the fact remains that moderates will find it difficult to go against the Ummah in a fight against a civilization considered alien and threatening to the survival of Islam.

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2007) found in his study that there is strong support for terrorism in countries with an anti-Americanism and anti- West feeling; there is a strong support for a political role for Islam. Also, those supporting a greater role for Islam in the polity and in governance are more likely to support terrorism. In such a scenario, there is little scope for moderates to play any role, at least in the short run. Only those moderates who do not have pro-western views can rightfully speak for moderation.

El Fadl (2007) has argued that Islam is facing a tussle between moderates and puritans. Both believe that their convictions are rooted in the Holy Koran and Sunnah. Moderates accuse puritans of misinterpreting the religion and defiling it and the puritans accuse the moderates of diluting and corrupting the religion and the great tradition. Puritans also believe that moderates are doing so at the behest of the West, which is bent on dominating the Muslim world. Though they are miniscule in number, the puritans unfortunately have become the 'brand' ambassador of Islam since they speak with the gun in hand (El Fadl, 2007).

Jurgensmeyer (2001) has argued that tension between mainstream and militant religion has existed in every tradition. Militants are always on the periphery of their community. Militants indulge in violence to counterbalance their marginality and to gain a position of power vis-à-vis the moderates and mainstream rivals within their own

community. Cohen (1994) disagrees, arguing that structural variables cannot directly explain the outcome of a conflict in a society, for they only define the constraints and opportunities. Outcomes, instead, are dependent on preferences and actions of the actors involved, that is moderates and hardliners. Further, the moderates *being* moderate by nature are easily scared away or silenced by the gun-toting hardliners. Yet another argument that could be made is that even when organizations have voiced concerns about the growing violence in Muslim communities, such voices are not sufficiently audible, lost in the din of cries for the blood of infidels.

The debate thus raises the following questions:

- Do moderate Muslims have a role to play in combating Jihad? If yes, then to what extent and under what circumstances?
- Under what conditions might radicals be made or induced to become more moderate?
- And, under what conditions might moderates be made firmer in their stance toward radicals?

I will answer these questions by delving into the role played by moderates vis-à-vis radicals in conflicts having religious overtones. For this reason I have selected three cases: 1) the militancy in Punjab, where Sikhs fought for the separate state of Khalistan, 2) the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, where the Islamists waged a bitter war for implementation of Sharia (Kepel, 2002), and 3) creation of Pakistan in 1947 on grounds that Muslims could not live with Hindus and the subsequent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan.

In this thesis, I shall suggest that moderate Muslims have limited their role in fighting against their co-religionists who have waged war against the infidels not only because we do not know how to sufficiently motivate them, but also because even if moderates recognize that the current war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations, they fear being excommunicated or labeled traitors for siding with the enemies of their religion. More than being labeled traitors - for they know they are not - they fear the gun. I shall argue that the state has to create the conditions suitable for moderates to act, for

moderates, by definition, are easily silenced by gun-toting extremists. Essentially, the reign of terror unleashed by insurgents / Islamists invariably scares away moderates (McCormick et al., 2007).

In Punjab and Algeria the radical leaders had to be either eliminated or removed from the scene before moderates could make a comeback. Without state support, moderates neither have the resources nor the mental make up (moderates being moderate by nature) to fight the radicals. In the case of Pakistan, where the ruling elites – both civilian and military - have preferred to use radicals for their own political and strategic ends, the radicals have been able to silence the moderates. This underlines the importance of reducing the sphere of influence of radicals before the moderates can play any meaningful role that can lead to fruitful results.

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II. WHO ARE MODERATES AND WHO ARE RADICALS

At this stage it is relevant to survey some commonly cited definitions of moderate and radical. Jurgensmeyer (2001) has suggested that willingness to accept the flaws on one's own side is the first step towards resolution of conflict. Yet radicals who are waging a war willed by God cannot have flaws and, therefore, will not be willing to negotiate. Further, if their goal is empowerment that comes with using violence; such persons have to be categorized as radicals. Esposito and Mogahed (2006) labels Muslims who found the 9/11 attack justified as radicals and those who found it unjustified as moderates.

Moaddel and Talattof (2002) have argued that Islamist violence does not just reflect a debate between Islamic Fundamentalists and the Western world, but also represents an ideological debate within Islam. They have classified Islamic scholars and leaders as modernists or fundamentalists based on their views on issues like jurisprudence, rational science, Islam and politics, Islam and Western civilization, Islamic modernism and the issue of women, and style of living. Moaddel and Talattof have observed that while theologians like Afghani, Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and Chiragh Ali were impressed by the west's scientific and technological progress and western style of life and liberalism, scholars like Ayatollah Khomeini, Maulana Abul ala Mowdudi, and Syed Qutb – whose ideals the Jihadis are following - rejected the western model and outlook (Moaddel and Talattof, 2002).

While Moaddel and Talatoff have studied conflicts within the Muslim community to distinguish moderates from radicals, Habeck has looked at how Muslims view other religions to decide who is moderate and who is not. Habeck argues that extremists want eternal conflict with non-believers, while the moderates have no compunction in accommodating the non-believers and the modernity (Habeck, 2006, p. 42).

Zahab and Roy (2004) has argued that while Salafists are fundamentalists they are not radicals. She defines only those organizations as radical that are actively engaged in Jihad – the armed struggle. She argues that while all Jihadists are Salafists, all Salafists

are not Jihadis. Many Salafists are opposed to Jihad – the armed struggle- either tactically or by conviction, and advocate Da’wa or “the call” to Islam as the preferred form of action. The degree of dependence on Jihad or Da’wa, according to Zahab and Roy, allows us to distinguish between radicals and moderates. Organizations like Jaish e Mohammad, Lashkar e Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, and Al Qaeda believe that Jihad is the only way to unite the Muslims of the world and recall them to the true practice of Islam. On the other hand, Tabligh e Jamat and Hizb ul Tahrir (in Uzbekistan) place their emphasis on individual dimensions of faith as the basis for rebuilding the ummah. These, of course, do not represent watertight compartments. Members move from one compartment to the other more freely and frequently than generally believed. Further, both kinds of group require painting someone as the enemy, which mainly is the USA at present, and to a lesser extent Israel and India (Zahab and Roy, 2004). While the radicals detest the hegemonic tendencies of the U.S., the fundamentalists are concerned about the cultural pervasiveness of the West in general.

Hafez (2003, p. 5) has defined moderates as individuals and groups who shun violence as a strategy to effect social change and instead seek to work through state institutions and civic associations to Islamize the society and politics. Radicals, on the other hand, reject accommodation with the state and refuse to participate in its institutions and insist on the necessity of violence to achieve Islamization. In other words, Hafez focuses on the behavior and tactics of the moderates, and not their ideological orientation. Based on such behavior and tactics he has labeled Jamat e Islami of Pakistan along with its leader Maulana Maududi moderate because the latter, though he had radical beliefs, adopted the strategy of achieving his goals through peaceful means by working through the state institutions, courts, and party politics.

Already we can begin to see how difficult it is to separate radicals from moderates because while moderates may have radical objectives they may adopt non-violent and legal processes to achieve their objectives. Similarly, there could be radicals who could be fighting what they regard as an absolutely legal battle by violent means, for example, the protest by Islamists against the dictatorial regime of Suharto in Indonesia. Further, the distinction between radicals and moderates becomes blurred when radicals pursue

moderate means as a matter of tactics and not as a matter of conviction - for example, the FIS in Algeria had a radical ideology, but preferred to use a legalistic and constitutional route to pursue its goals of bringing about Islamic rule in the country.

Hafez has argued that it is neither necessary for Islamists to be satisfied to become moderate nor deprived to become radical; it is the political environment in which they operate (mobilize, and acquire resources) that decides whether the movement will be violent or peaceful. Hafez has argued that rebels take to institutional exclusion on the one hand, and reactive and excessive indiscriminate force used by the state on the other. This forces Islamist movements to adopt an anti-system ideology. Once the movement adopts an anti-system ideology, however, it faces competition between moderates and radicals from within. Those who want to seek peace feel their efforts are sabotaged by those who want to continue fighting. The internal violence thus has a penchant for becoming more expansive and less rational (Hafez, 2003, p. 22).

Thus, we see that different scholars define moderates and radicals differently. For the purposes of this study, I shall consider those who do not pursue their objectives by violent means to be moderates, while those who adopt a violent route to achieve changes in society I consider radicals. I do this for reasons that a closer examination of the three cases should make clear.

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III. JOURNEY FROM PUNJABI SUBA TO KHALISTAN

India is a country with incredible ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. There is a high degree of cultural and religious syncretism that keeps these ethnic groups together. Yet, at times these divisions have assumed the shape of serious conflicts and threatened the territorial integrity of the state. One such threat had come from militancy in the Punjab when Sikh extremists called for secession from India and creation of Khalistan on the grounds that Sikhs were a separate nation because Sikhism was a separate religion - a call similar to one given by Jinnah that led to the eventual division of the subcontinent and creation of Pakistan. In the Punjab, the terror unleashed by Sikh extremists led to the death of 21,000 people and caused a severe rift between Hindus and Sikhs who had previously lived in harmony, so much so that after the partition of Punjab in 1947, Sikhs preferred to leave their homes in Pakistani West Punjab and migrate and live with Hindus in India.

In this chapter, I shall discuss how the political wrangles between the two major political parties led to turmoil in the Punjab, a strategically located state. The mainstream political parties in the Punjab – the Congress and the Akali Dal - used the radicals in their pursuit of power in utter disregard for the damage that the radicals might cause to longstanding communal harmony in the region. KPS Gill, the Director General of Police in Punjab during the time when militancy was at its peak, has argued that the movement for Khalistan was created out of venal politics and brazen jockeying for power (Gill, 1999 p. 5). Unfortunately, what may have begun as a political gambit soon assumed Frankenstein proportions and grew beyond the control of its fomenters. Mounting violence led to erosion in Congress' popularity in the state. At the same time, the Akali Dal's failure to wrest any concession from the central government eroded its mass appeal amongst the Sikhs and, worse, strengthened the separatists' had. Cynthia Kepley Mahmood (1996, p. 107) has argued that the development of Sikhism during the period of the Gurus in 15th to 17th century, in the face of opposition from the Muslim rulers of the day, provided the ideological base for the Khalistan movement.

Simaranjit Singh Mann, one of the proponents of Khalistan, who had resigned from the prestigious Indian Police Service in the wake of Operation Blue Star (the attack on the Golden Temple to flush out the militants), did not view the conflict as merely the consequence of political machinations between two political parties. He argued that the Sikh movement was meant to assert Sikh identity and demand what they considered to be their rights (Jurgensmeyer, 2003, p. 89). For minorities in India, secularism is often considered a ploy for Hindu domination. Such views are strengthened by small incidents involving for instance, the practices of Puja and Arti – purely Hindu customs - that often mark the inauguration of official buildings, or of seminars and conferences funded by the state.

The religious nature of the conflict in Punjab can also be gauged from the targeted killing of Hindus, though the militants soon started targeting those Sikhs who did not share their hardline views and who advised moderation. Militants belonging to the Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa, and other militant groups that were fighting for prevention of the dilution of the Sikh faith, believed that the religion could only be saved by Sikhs attaining a state of their own.

The Sikh desire to have a state first took roots when the Arya Samaj, a Hindu reformist organization, attempted to subsume Sikhism in Hinduism in the 1870s. The Sikhs responded by forming the Singh Sabha to emphasize Sikhs' separate identity. However, the movement for Khalistan in the 1980s was definitely more intense, more violent, and more religious than earlier attempts by Sikhs to acquire a separate state at the time of partition or a separate province for Sikhs when India was being reorganized on linguistic lines in the mid-1950s (Tully and Jacob, 1985).

A. FORMATION OF THE SIKH NATIONHOOD

The Akali Dal emerged as an important political party espousing the interests of Sikhs in 1925 after the British acceded to the Akalis' demand and allowed the Sikhs to form a committee to manage Sikh religious shrines (Tully and Jacob, 1985, p. 31, Tatla 1999, p. 30-4; Telford 1992, p. 973-4). Following the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan as a separate country for the Muslims of India, the Sikhs too demanded a

separate state. However, their demand was too feeble and was seen by the British as an attempt to obfuscate the creation of Pakistan (Tully and Jacob, 1985, p. 35). During the colonial era Sikhs constituted only 13% of the population in undivided Punjab (Ali, ND, p. 50). The creation of Pakistan led to the division of Punjab, with 60 percent of Punjab's territory going to Pakistan and 40 percent to India. Hindus preferred to migrate from West Punjab to India and Muslims from East Punjab to Pakistan. The Sikhs were wooed by the Muslim League in an attempt to keep them in Pakistan and to acquire the whole of Punjab (except Ambala Division). But the Sikhs – for whom their persecution by Mughal rulers still weighed heavily - decided instead to join India. Like their Hindu neighbors, then, the Sikhs of West Punjab preferred to migrate to East Punjab (Ali, ND: 51; Mahmood, 1996, p. 107).

Until 1877, Sikhs had always had cordial and harmonious relations with Hindus. That was the year that the Arya Samaj, a Hindu society, propagated the notion that Sikhs were part of the broader Hindu family. Wary of Hindus' propensity to absorb local religions, the Sikhs started the Singh Sabha to assert that theirs was a different religion (Mahmood, 1996, p. 118; Deol, 2000, p. 73; Weiss, 2002, p. 3).

Though the Sikh population was consolidated on the Indian side of Punjab after partition, they were still in a minority there. Indeed, Akalis who were dependent on Sikh votes were hopelessly disadvantaged. This is one reason they favored a separate political status for Sikhs. This, they argued, was essential for preserving an “independent Sikh entity” (Deol 2000, pp. 94, 98). Akalis demand for a separate state for the Punjabi speaking people was also aimed preserving the Sikh identity. This demand meant that the Hindi speaking area would be cut away, and the Sikhs would have a slight demographic majority in the truncated Punjab. In the truncated Punjab the Sikhs would constitute 54% of the population, and Hindus 44%; 2% being followers of other religions, mainly Christian (Deol, 2000).

Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, who had agreed to reorganize other states on linguistic grounds, refused to accept the Akalis' demand, declaring that it was a communal demand. But after his death in 1964, their wish was finally granted. On November 1, 1966, Punjabi speaking areas were demarcated and retained as Punjab while

Hindi speaking area became a new state – Haryana. The erstwhile capital city, Chandigarh, then became the common capital of the two states. This special status, however, made it necessary to bring Chandigarh under the direct administration of the central government. Thus, not only did Punjab get substantially truncated, it also lost its capital, Chandigarh. Creation of Haryana also led to a portion of Punjab's water share going to Haryana. Consequently, Punjab's water share from the Beas and Sutlej rivers was reduced from 7.2 million acre feet (maf) to 5 maf; 2.2 maf went to Haryana (Singh, 2002, p. 72).

Sikhs, who mainly live as farmers in the rural areas, felt that their interests were sidetracked in favor of predominantly Hindu Haryana. Agricultural production in the state increased many times during the green revolution (in the late 1960s and early 1970s). Ironically this only added to Punjab's woes, by among other things, leading to increased demand for fertilizer, oil or electricity for the water pumps, and cheap credit – all three being well beyond local farmers' control. At the same time, prosperity afforded more educational opportunities. But then, with the lack of employment in cities, the number of educated unemployed rose. Meanwhile, demand for unskilled labor in the rural areas brought in migrant laborers from neighboring states, adding to the difficulties for rural unskilled Punjabis.

The Akalis, who had successfully fought for the Punjabi Suba, still failed to form a government in Punjab. They failed to win away those Sikhs who remained loyal to the Indian National Congress, and Akalis lost the elections to the nationalist Congress in 1967 and 1972. Even in 1977, when Congress lost power in most of the northern states, including Punjab, Akalis were not able to form a government on their own. Akalis had to accept the support of the Hindu party. Congress, anxious to regain power in Punjab, was determined to break this alliance (Kohli, 1997, p. 336).

B. THE POLITICAL GAMES

In 1978, the Indian National Congress with the help of the Dal Khalsa, the All India Sikh Students Federation, and Sant Bhindranwale, an upcoming orthodox Sikh religious leader, sponsored 40 candidates for the powerful Shiromani Gurdwara

Prabandhak Committee, which controlled all the Sikh shrines in Punjab, and thus the purse strings in the state. At the same time, tension was rising between the Nirankaris (a sect of Sikhism) and the orthodox Sikhs belonging to Dam Dami Taksal (a religious school) led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. This came to a head and turned violent on April 13, 1978; Nirankaris killed 11 followers of Sant Bhindranwale during a march to persuade the Nirankaris not to keep the Guru Granth Sahib (the holy book) lower than the seat of Nirankari Guru (Singh, 2002). The courts, however, set the Nirankaris free adjudging that they acted in self defense. In retaliation, Bhindranwale's followers killed the Nirankari Guru Baba Gurcharan Singh in April 1980. However, the Congress, which came back to power in Punjab in 1981, was reluctant to take action against Bhindranwale, whom they regarded as a religious leader who was capable of challenging the Akalis and loosen Akalis' grip on the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (the committee that manages the Sikh shrines in the Punjab).

To counter the Congress' attempt to divide the Sikhs, as well as to neutralize Bhindranwale's increasing influence, the Akalis mobilized the Sikh peasantry in a major campaign, dubbed "Dharam Yudh" (the religious war) in 1980. This was a clever ploy to combine economic, cultural, constitutional, and religious demands. For instance, the demand for an increased share of river water, the demand for extension of the SGPC's control over all the Gurdwaras in India, and the political demand for restoring Chandigarh to Punjab, the last being an emotional issue for the urban Punjabis. The demand for more water appealed to the predominantly farming community. The demand for Chandigarh appealed to the urban population. In addition, Akalis demanded a radical renegotiation of powers between the center and the states with the center only looking after only defense, foreign relations and currency (Tatla, 1999, p. 27). Acceptance of such a demand was, of course, fraught with implications for India's territorial integrity and security, especially since the central government regarded itself as playing a big role in the integration of a country that had attained independence barely 30 years ago.

In September 1981, the Akali Dal, supported by the Akali-dominated Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, adopted the slogan, "Sikhs are a separate nation." This demand caused divide between Hindus and Sikhs in the state leading to the assassination

of Lala Jagat Narain, a vocal opponent of the Akali slogan and the editor of *Punjab Kesari*, a popular Hindi daily published in Jalandhar in Punjab's heartland (Weiss, 2002).

The Akalis' plank of "Sikhs – a separate nation" was taken over by the increasingly orthodox and militant Bhindranwale, who by now had turned into a virulent critic of the Congress, his former supporter. It appears Bhindranwale aimed to rejuvenate Sikhism by promoting orthodoxy and austere living, and sought to establish himself as a leader of the Sikh panth. Within three years, Bhindranwale had become one of the most popular Sikh leaders in Punjab (Telford 1992, pp. 974-6; Deol 2000, p. 104). He allied himself with the All-India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF), the militant end of the Akali spectrum, that openly demanded Khalistan, a separate nation for Sikhs. The mainstream Akali leadership still preferred negotiations to confrontation, though some of the right wing Akalis did make statements, which had separatist overtones (Major 1987, pp. 46-48).

The aligning of the AISSF with the popular Bhindranwale put pressure on the Akali Dal (Telford 1992, pp. 982-5). Under Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal formed an uneasy, mutually exploitative coalition with Bhindranwale and launched a campaign of demonstrations and passive resistance against the central government in August 1982.

Once mobilized, Sikh militants very quickly gained political advantage over moderate Sikh leaders. Kohli (1997, p. 337) suggests that the move toward autonomy was primarily a political ploy for most moderate Akalis, but once the discourse had shifted in that direction, any efforts moderates made to work with the central government just undermined their leadership: "normal politics made the moderates look like opportunists not worthy of a leadership mantle" (Kohli 1997, p. 337). Indira Gandhi refused to compromise in 1982-84 on non-secession issues like control over river water, agricultural subsidies, and Chandigarh, as she did not want to seem to be appeasing minorities. Nor did she want the Akalis to get credit at the cost of Congress by agreeing to these demands. The Central government's recalcitrance further weakened Sikh moderates and

privileged militants instead. The situation quickly turned worse when Bhindranwale ordered his supporters to kill Hindus with a view to forcing the migration of Hindus from the state and an influx of Sikhs into the state (Singh, 2002, p. 53).

Increased violence by the militants led to terrorization of Hindus in towns and virtual lawlessness in rural areas. The militants intimidated villagers who were helpless against their violence (Jurgensmeyer, 2003, p. 91). To avoid arrest, Bhindranwale moved into the Akal Takht, the sanctum sanctorum, within the Golden Temple, the most revered Sikh shrine. Bhindranwale converted the Akal Takht into a fortified military base and ordered his supporters to carry out subversive and terrorist actions (Brar, 1993). Given the forces arrayed against them, the fortified Golden Temple proved beyond the reach of the state police and they were unable to take action against the militants hiding in the temple. The police also knew they were outgunned, which demoralized them. Their rifles, of WWI vintage, were no match for the terrorists' AK47s. To compound matters they were receiving confusing signals from the political bosses (Gill 1999, p. 6).

The government turned to the military in 1984. The military's first action, code named Operation Blue Star, that started on June 5, 1984 lasted 3 days and led to the deaths of 500 militants and 100 soldiers in addition to causing extensive damage to the temple - including the Akal Takht where the militants were hiding (Brar, 1993; Singh, 2002, p. 56; Walia, 2007). Although the Akal Takht and the temple were later restored by the government, the damage was done. The operation alienated the Sikh community as a whole; senior police officers like Simranjit Singh resigned and joined the radicals (Mahmood, 1996), Khushwant Singh a senior journalist, and a critic of the Khalistan, returned the Padma Bhushan, a national award that was bestowed on him in 1974 in recognition of his contribution in the field of journalism and literature, and worse yet the Sikh regiment at Ramgarh mutinied (Ravindran, 2006).

Sikhs lost faith in the secular nature of the Indian state, which no longer seemed to afford them and their religion sufficient protection. At the same time, desecration of any sacred place has the potential on its own to lead to significant grievances, separate from political and economic causes (Ravindran, 2006). The attack on the Golden Temple resulted in greater support for the demand for Khalistan (Pace, 1984).

Sikh militants struck back at the government when Indira Gandhi's two Sikh bodyguards killed her on October 31, 1984. The assassination led to anti-Sikh riots in many northern states. But the worst affected place was Delhi, where more than 3000 Sikhs were killed by rampaging Hindus led, in places, by Congress leaders. The administration was accused of taking no/little action for the first two days. This episode alienated the Sikhs still further (Singh, 2002, p. 57).

Operation Blue Star led the Akalis to realize that their maximalist demands had allowed the movement to slip beyond their control. In 1985, moderate Akali leaders like Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and Surjeet Singh Barnala entered into an agreement with the central government headed by Rajiv Gandhi. This accord represented more of a face-saving instrument for moderates than any real gains. Rajiv also announced elections in Punjab, which brought Akalis into power in the state, leading to a temporary drop in the level of violence. Indeed, more than 65% of the eligible population turned out to vote despite militants' call for a boycott of the elections, demonstrating that militancy had very few takers and that Sikhs were in favor of restoring amity. Militants suffered another setback when Bimal Khalsa and Tralok Singh, the wife of Beant Singh and father of Satwant Singh (Indira Gandhi's two assassins) lost by huge margins (Singh, 2002, p. 62).

The hardliners called the accord a sell-out. The moderate faction led by Prakash Singh Badal, politically most influential Akali leader, felt slighted by Longowal and Barnala, who had signed the agreement without consulting him. Thus, Badal refused to join the government. The duo of Longowal and Barnala did not consult Badal because they felt that Badal might not agree to the proposal. Also Badal had more followers than these two leaders, and definitely more than Balwant Singh who brokered the agreement. However, when Rajiv Gandhi found himself unable to implement his proffered compromises, Akali moderates were again undermined and militancy returned (Kohli 1997, pp. 337-8). The state government was not able to contain the violence for long. Hindu minorities in the state continued to be targeted by the militants, the other targets for the radicals being the moderate Sikh leaders. For instance, Sant Longowal, who had signed the Punjab Accord with Rajiv Gandhi, was killed by the militants. Not only did this indicate the militancy was back with a bang, but this time it was supported by

Pakistan (Gill, 1999, p. 11). Worse, the Akalis continued to feud among themselves (Singh, 2002, p. 76). The breakdown in law and order in the state forced the central government to dismiss the Akali government and bring the state under central administration (Sarab Jit Singh, 2002, p. 24). The militants were once again ruling the rural areas.

C. FACING THE MILITANTS

By 1988, the militants again sneak into the Golden Temple and fortified it. This time they did so with even greater zeal. Increasing violence and lawlessness demanded action be taken against them. However, the political leadership was reluctant to repeat the events of 1984 that had alienated the whole Sikh community. This time the administration decided to simply lay siege to the temple, cutting the militants' supplies. All routes to the temple were sealed and a curfew was imposed on the whole district, severely restricting movement. At the same time, the district administration ensured that supplies of food and essential items reached residents. This attitude of the district administration coupled with the avoidance of desecrating temple isolated the extremists. People did not want to have their temple desecrated again (Singh, 2002, p. 127). Bereft of supplies and dismayed by peoples' reluctance to come to their aid the militants were forced to sneak out of the temple.

Gill has admitted that very few terrorists, who had been hiding in the temple were captured during Operation Black Thunder. Nonetheless, the operation broke the back of the insurgency as it lost the religious legitimacy it had been counting on. Indeed from this point on the militants proved increasingly easy to brand as criminal and to round up by the police (Gill, 1999, p. 16), which is not to say that extrajudicial killings, torture, anonymous arrests, and more did not take place. Apart from the seizure of the Golden Temple in 1988 by the militants, the declining economy, and the unbridled violence of the militants who indulged in rampant killing of Hindus as well as Sikhs diminished any sympathy for the militants (Telford, 1992, p. 986). Government measures were harsh; civilians felt squeezed between warring security forces and militants with civilian

casualties accounting for nearly three-fourths of all killings (Major, 1987, pp. 55-6). However, in the end the state proved able to prevail, perhaps because it made fewer mistakes than the militants in this second round of violence.

Defeat of terrorism in Punjab was a result of counter-insurgency measures - employing coercion by the state and simultaneously seeking to negotiate certain changes in power structure. KPS Gill has maintained that use of force and coercion are not only necessary expedients, but the fundamental duty of the state when it comes to restoring order (Gill, 1999, p. 2). From 1987 on, the central government had to adopt tough measures. The Terrorist and Disruptive Act (TADA) was promulgated for Punjab, giving extraordinary discretionary powers to security forces. The police were provided with adequate number of quality weapons of quality that could match those of the terrorists. Police stations were upgraded both in men and materiel, making them capable of reacting immediately and independently to any act of terrorism in their area of jurisdiction (Gill, 1999, p. 20) This effort was greatly enhanced by reinforcement from Army and Central Police forces (Gill, 1999, p. 59).

The guerrilla movement (comprised of around twenty militant organizations in Punjab) was fractured by rifts over policies and tactics. Plus, it struggled with finding sufficient resources and recruits. The question of whether to raise social reform issues during the period of armed struggle or to hold off on these was especially divisive. Moreover, given the nature of the movement and high casualty rates, there was a constant need to recruit new guerillas, but no time for ideological or disciplinary training. The necessarily decentralized organizational structure of the overall guerilla 'organization' and the weakness of prevailing institutional structures aggravated the situation. Importantly, too, the guerrillas had lost ideological credibility and their support base among much of the Sikh community by 1991-92.

In the end, the Indian state proved strong enough to retain control, even if it applied considerable brute force in containing or repressing Sikh militants until waning popular support and flagging recruitment rates caused the militancy to wither (Kohli, 1997, pp. 337-8). The elimination of extremists created a safe environment in which moderates could become active and participate in state affairs. As Tatla put it, "The

realpolitik of resources bargaining and distribution has returned, the Indian state has ‘managed’ another ethnic conflict and the aggrieved group has returned to normal politics by sharing power with the state government” (Tatla, 1999, p. 30).

D. ASSESSMENT

The Akali Dal fell into its own trap when it demanded implementation of the Anadpur Sahib resolution, seeking far reaching autonomy for the province and severe curtailment of the power of the central government limiting its role to defense, foreign affairs, and currency. Such a demand was not likely to be met, for India was still building the nation and the central government played a major role in keeping all the states together. The Akali’s demand threatened the disintegration of the country. However, having made such a demand, it was difficult for the Akali Dal to climb down without losing face in relation to the hardliners. Moderate Akali leaders like Longowal, Barnala, and Badal feared that softening their stance could give preeminence to Tohra, a hardline Akali and the chief of the SGPC. However, the more the Akalis pursued these demands, and the central government refused, the more the militant wing headed by Sant Bhindranwale gained ground. The fortification of the Golden Temple, and the subsequent attack on it by the security forces, led to large-scale alienation of Sikhs and the moderates were marginalized completely.

Government repression led to the formation of various splinter groups of militants, such as the Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation Force, and Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan. Each competed for supremacy and influence. The proliferation of different groups made the task of negotiation difficult. Negotiations entered into by Sant Longowal and Barnala with Rajiv government, for instance, were rendered ineffective by militants who killed Longowal and raised the level of violence. The legitimacy of the accord was damaged right at the outset because Longowal had failed to bring along Badal, a prominent politician with more influence and followers than Longowal or Barnala. The duo of Barnala and Longowal had also failed to take into confidence the militant wing headed by Simranjit Singh Mann who had the support of the AISSF.

The failure of the Punjab accord convinced the central government that negotiating with the Akalis had little relevance because the extremists were not likely to honor such an accord. The extremists themselves were too divided. Thus, the government could not negotiate with them. This compelled the government to adopt the strategy of eliminating the extremist leadership. Security was beefed up in the state. The police were given the modern weapon they needed to fight the militants. Once the police had modern weapons they felt sufficiently emboldened to challenge to the militants when they attacked in the rural areas. Security provided in the villages paid rich dividends; the villagers now secure from attacks by militants, were more forthcoming in providing vital information to the police. The proliferation of militant groups also it made infiltration much easier. Indulgence of militants in criminal activities such as land grabbing and settling personal vendetta, smuggling, and drug trafficking etc further alienated them from people.

Once the militants were on the run, moderate voices could reemerge. Elections for the state assembly were held in February 1992. The Akali Dal, the main opposition party boycotted the election. This made the election look farcical. The Congress, the nationalist party, won the election by a huge margin. A semblance of popular government was established in the state (Deol, 2000).

IV. ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR

One of modern history's most savage civil wars took place in Algeria in the 1990s, claiming over 150,000 lives, including those of many intellectuals and journalists (Aljazeera News Report, 2007). Though there are differences over the numbers of people killed, all sources agree on the savagery of the violence – ripping open pregnant women, killing children by smashing them on the ground, or severing off men's limbs one by one - perpetrated by the warring sides. The military adopted the policy of eradicating the militants and negotiating with the moderates. The civil strife ended with the victory of government forces; the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) surrendered and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was defeated and rendered ineffective.

The Islamic fundamentalists erupted into a full-fledged revolt and unleashed an unprecedented reign of terror when Algeria's military removed Benjedid Chadli and canceled parliamentary elections in 1992, which the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), with its platform of governing by Islamic law, was set to win. The military doubted FIS's commitment to democracy. Often the party itself sent conflicting signals. While Madani, the FIS' moderate face would talk about the virtues of pluralism and democracy in a society, his firebrand deputy professed, "When we will be in power there will be no more elections because God will be ruling." Benhadj was firm that elections were only a tool to get power and once in power Islamic rule would be imposed (Takeyh, 2003). In contrast, more radical groups believed that Islamic rule could be brought only by the sword. The cancellation of elections thus confirmed for radicals in the party that Islamic rule could only be attained through violence. The most notorious of the radicals formed the Armed Islamic Group, which was believed to be largely responsible for the series of village massacres that characterized the ensuing war. About 100,000 civilians were butchered between 1993 and 1998. The impact of war could even be felt in Europe, especially France, the erstwhile colonial master of Algeria. There were bombings in Paris in 1995 and 1996. Faced with armed rebellion, the Algerian military unleashed state terror and adopted the policy of eliminating those who did not come to the negotiating table. In the

end, the militants could not stand up to the might of security forces and eventually broke into splinter groups, which were easily eliminated by the security forces.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The fight for liberation in Algeria was fought as much on behalf of Islamic-Arabic culture as modern nationalism (Willis, 1996 and Roberts, 2003). The Movement was fought under the umbrella of the *Front de Libération nationale* (FLN). Nationalists of various hues – leftists, religious leaders, and elitists- joined hands to fight the external enemy, France. The religious parties played a significant role in the nationalist movement in Algeria. For instance, the Association of Ulama of Algeria (AUMA), was the first organization to take up cudgels against French rule in Algeria in the 1930s. Unfortunately, it was significantly weakened as a result of systemic assaults by the French and the death of its main leader, Ben Badis, in 1941. Yet, the AUMA's slogan - "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Algeria is my country"- was adopted by the FLN. Thus, Islam can be said to have been at center stage in the nationalists' call for independence – at least in theory (Kepel, 2002, p. 162).

Once Algeria was independent, thanks to AUMA's early influence, the Algerian Constitution declared Islam to be the state religion and declared that only a Muslim could become President of the nation (Willis, 1996). However, for governance purposes, the FLN adopted the Soviet model of single party rule and the administration was dominated by socialists and those who had played a significant role in the liberation war. This resulted in exclusion of the religious parties (Willis, 1996; Kepel, 2002, p. 162; Hafez, 2003).

With a view to placating the Islamists, Ben Bella's government claimed that Islam was a socialist religion and also made symbolic changes, such as declaring the Ramadan fast a national duty and imposing restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol (Willis, 1996, p. 38). The Islamists remained unconvinced by these cosmetic changes. Bachir Ibrahimi, an Islamic scholar, declared that the rulers in Algeria would have to forsake foreign doctrine and go back to their Arab- Islamic roots, while the more radical Islamists organized themselves under Al Qiyam al Islamiya, led by Hachemi Tijani an

ardent follower of the ideology propounded by Qutb and Maududi. *Humanisme Musulman*, Al Qiyam's paper, wrote in 1965 – "All Parties, all regimes, and all leaders, which did not base themselves on Islam are illegal and dangerous. A communist party, a secular party, a Marxist party, a nationalist party (the latter putting in question the unity of Muslim world) cannot exist in the land of Islam" (Willis, 1996, p. 40). This writing reflects the influence of the teachings of Qutb on the Islamists in Algeria. While Islamic scholars like Jamal al Afghani, Syed Ahmad Khan, and many other reformists were not averse to using western technology and ideas to promote Islam, Qutb and Mawdoodi argued that Muslim societies had become polluted by western and non-Islamic influences, and that Islam needed to be purged of such alien influences. If needed, Islam needed to be cleansed by revolutionary means (Moaddel and Talattof, 2002). Qutb and Mawdoodi advocated replacing western laws by God-given Sharia for the emancipation of Muslims (Kepel, 1987).

The FLN, which had managed to unite religious, socialist, and nationalist ideologies during the liberation war, soon lost control over the religious sphere of Algerian political life to Al Qiyam.

Eventually, in 1965, Ben Bella was replaced in a bloodless coup by Colonel Houari Boumedienne. Boumedienne accused Ben Bella of copying the west. He stressed Algeria's Islamic roots, accommodated more Islamists in his administration, and promoted Arabic and Islamic education in order to undercut support for the Islamists. However, in doing so it was clear that Boumedienne used the Islamic card for purely political gain. He, too, followed the socialist policies of his predecessor. The Al Qiyam continued with its radical calls for things such as closure of shops at prayer time, the exclusion of non-Muslims from public service, segregation of the sexes in schools and universities, and dress codes for women. The violent agitation for placing restrictions on women in Algeria, however, forced Boumedienne to finally ban the Al Qiyam in 1971 (Vallin, 1973).

The differences between the FLN and religious leaders on the role of Islam remained. While Boumedienne was keen to use Islam to forge Algeria's national identity, he was averse to the idea of theocratic rule. Algeria's religious leaders, on the other hand,

wanted the regime to reject socialism as a foreign concept and implement Sharia instead (Willis, 1996, p. 62). However, such extreme views could never gather enough popular support to challenge Boumedienne's regime, mainly because Boumedienne was able to take the sting out of the Islamists' argument by Arabizing education and, more significantly, because on the economic front the country was doing well thanks to the high international oil/gas prices.

Boumediene's death in 1978 brought Chadli Benjedid into power in February 1979. Like his predecessors, Chadli courted the Islamists to consolidate his position. Many of the Islamists who were arrested during Boumediene's rule were released from prison. Abde Rahman, sympathetic to the Islamists' cause, was appointed the Minister for Religious Affairs. People committed to Arabization were similarly posted in the Ministry of Education and Culture. On Fridays, the state-controlled media broadcast programs with exclusively Islamic themes (Willis, 1996, p. 77). Chadli also granted concessions to Islamists by introducing a new Family Code in 1984 that defined and restricted women's rights to marriage, divorce, and work. Surprisingly, the restrictions did not prompt any protest from women's groups, perhaps a sign of their capitulation to the violence that preceded these restrictions (Willis, 1996, p. 78). Chadli also initiated state-financed mosque construction and opened Amir Abdel Kader Islamic University at Constantine. The university helped train imams and, to do so, invited renowned Muslim scholars from Egypt – Mohammad al Ghazali and Yusuf al Qaradawi. However, instead of bolstering the Islamic credentials of FLN, these scholars encouraged an Islamic awakening of the Muslim Brotherhood kind (Kepel, 2002, p. 165).

Although the state had imposed Arabic in schools and colleges, few *Arabisants* could find buyers in the job market, where a premium was placed on speaking French instead. This led to large-scale protests in universities and became the catalyst for frequent battles between the rural, Arabic speaking students on one side and the leftists and Francophones on the other. University campuses became a battleground for the two groups. In some instances Islamist students took over classrooms and converted them into mosques; they also forced sexual segregation (Willis, 1996, p. 71). In the rural areas and

in smaller towns government-nominated imams were forcefully replaced by imams belonging to the extremist groups; private mosques were mushrooming all over the countryside.

In 1979, Mustafa Bouyali, a hardline Islamist who had also taken part in the liberation war, formed the Group for Defence Against Illicit [sic], which spoke against the socialist policies of the government and fought for a return to Islamic values in social and political life. Once large scale violence had broken out at the universities, and with the government arrest of students, Bouyali and his radical followers went underground and formed the Islamic Movement of Algeria (MIA). The MIA declared an armed insurrection against the state and engaged in violent action, attacking unIslamic symbols such as girls' schools, liquor shops, and cinema halls (Willis, 1996, p. 72; Kepel, 2002, p. 164).

Chadli, who had been soft-peddling against the Islamists with a view to stifling leftists within the regime, had to change his stance when Islamists seized mosques in Sidi Bel Abbes in 1981 from the government appointed imams. The government responded by arresting the main leaders of the agitation, Abdellatif Soltani, Ahmed Sahnoun, and Abbasi Madani. The regime also struck against Bouyali's MIA. Bouyali was killed in an encounter in 1987. However, this did not bring a halt to the protests in the cities.

As declining international oil prices began to hurt the economy, Chadli was forced to introduce economic reforms, such as a reduction in subsidies, etc. that were unpopular with urban as well as rural populations who were already reeling under the effect of a declining economy. This prompted further protests, many of which turned violent. In fact, it was when a large protest march by students and Islamists turned violent in 1988 that now appears to mark a watershed in Algerian history. The military had to be called in to control the violence. The military acted with alacrity and with brute force; in its first action more than 50 protestors were killed (Willis, 1996, p. 107).

The weakening economy and growing political unrest fuelled resentment against Chadli's leadership in the party. With a view to countering his critics he made large scale political changes, allowing religious parties to take part in the political process. In the

elections held for local offices, the FLN was routed. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), led by Madani and Belhaj, won most of the seats, though Chadli played down the win by the FIS and stated that the Islamists would fail to make any dent in the national elections. However, he increased the number of seats in Parliament from 295 to 430. Most of the increased seats went to southern Algeria, the traditional stronghold of the FLN. Madani could see through the game Chadli was playing and called for a general strike to protest against this unfair increase in the number and unjust distribution of seats. The elections in 1991 revealed the extent to which the Islamists had gained ground. They won 189 of the 228 seats in the first round of the elections. There was no reason to believe they would not only win the next election, but could also gain the 2/3rd majority that could grant them the power to make changes in the constitution.

The country's military leadership, meanwhile, believed that the FIS hold not only be a political and economic disaster, but would bring conflict to large areas of Algeria by going full force with its Arabization and Islamization agenda. In January 1992, the military acted weeks before the second round of elections, overthrowing Chadli, and cracking down against the FIS. The top leadership of the FIS was arrested and the party was finally dissolved in March 1992.

The FIS responded by declaring the new military regime unconstitutional and promising that rule by the sword would be responded to in kind (Willis, 1996, pp. 267; Hafez, 2003). The coup strengthened the resolve of the radical Islamists within and outside the FIS that only force of arms could achieve an Islamic state. The MIA activists, who were released as a result of a general amnesty offered by Chadli's regime in 1990, began organizing. This is how cancellation of the elections led to the onset of the brutal civil war.

B. ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: COOPERATION, FRAGMENTATION, AND CONFLICT

The Islamist movement in Algeria was never monolithic. There were serious differences over leadership and deep ideological chasms over nationalism vs pan-Islamism and violent vs. peaceful protest. Opening up the political process split the

Islamists into two groups. One, led by Madani and Belhadj, advocated taking part in the elections. The other, led by Soltani and Nahnah, felt that Islamic education and propagation were better done from outside the political process (Willis, 1996, p. 117). Roberts (2003, p. 131) has called the latter gradualists for believing that Dawa (proselytization) should precede the political quest for Islamic rule. While Madani urged people not to involve themselves with Bouyali's violent campaigns, Mahfoud Nahnah, though a moderate, continued to maintain close links with the more violent Bouyali as a counter to his opponents in the moderate groups (Willis, 1996, pp. 80-81).

A new party called Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was formed in February 1989 with Madani as its president and Belhadj, a preacher from Algiers, as his deputy. Belhaj rose to fame in the political turmoil that engulfed the state in the 1980s after the fall of oil prices. The party was recognized as a political party in September 1989 and it proved victorious in the local elections.

Other Islamists felt left behind and marginalized by the electoral success of the FIS. Nahnah initiated his own political party, HAMAS, and Djaballh started the Movement for Islamic Nation (MNI). Both were keen to share the FIS's popularity. However, both Madani and Belhadj feared dilution of their influence if they permitted HAMAS and MNI to share their political plank with them. This reluctance was purely selfish, since HAMAS as well as MNI had supported the FIS during the local elections (Willis, 1996, p. 168). A number of other Islamist groups with a radical orientation also appeared at the same time, such as Takfir wal Hijra, Jamat al Sunna wa al Sharia, and Ansa al Tawhid. However, these groups were marginal in relation to the FIS (Roberts, 2003; Hafez, 2003, p. 36)

C. THE CIVIL WAR

Unfortunately, the military crackdown led to further alienation of the moderate elements. At the same time, it led to the reemergence of the MIA which had been crushed after Bouyali's death in 1988 and had been marginalized as a result of the emergence of the FIS as a viable alternative to the FLN. Erstwhile MIA members like Abdelkadir Chebouti, Mansour Meliani, Azzedine Baa, and Mouloud Hattab, along with 'Afghan'

veterans and dissident radical groups within the FIS, such as Said Mekhloufi and Kemerredine Kherbane (who were removed from the Party's Majlis Shura in July 1991 following their advocacy of the armed struggle for attaining Islamic rule) quickly went underground and launched several attacks on the security forces. However, the radical groups found it difficult to coordinate their activities. The security forces were able to effectively hamper communications between the various factions of Islamists and thus avert their ability to coordinate attacks.

The differences among the militants appeared irreconcilable. Though Abdelkader Chebouti was declared the national emir, many groups were reluctant to submit to central authority. Meanwhile, Allal Mohammed was fast emerging as leader of an independent group that indulged in violence against the symbols of the state as well as civilians perceived to be sympathetic to the state. Chebouti and many other leaders were worried that the severity of the violence perpetrated by Allal's group, particularly the bombing of the Algiers airport on 26 August 1992 that led to the death of several innocent passengers, might alienate the people (Kepel, 2002).

Meanwhile, an attempt to bring together leaders of various factions during Ramadan in 1992 was dealt a severe blow by the security forces. They attacked these leaders as the meeting took place at Tamesguida. Allal Mohammed was killed in the encounter, while Chebouti and Seddikki (an Afghan veteran) managed to escape (Willis, 1996). This incident deepened the rift between Allal's followers and the Chebouti group.

Allal Mohammad's successor, Mansour Meliani, consolidated the group and named it the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). This group believed that Islamic rule could only be brought about by the use of the sword. However, Meliani was soon arrested by the state. After his arrest, GIA's leadership fell into the hands of Abdelhak Layada, a former lieutenant of Allal Mohammed's. Layada announced his intention to wage his war independently of the national emir. Thus, while Chebouti's fighters were directing their attack only against the security forces and the symbols of the state, and were doing so by sabotage and bombing, the GIA expanded the armed struggle by attacking soft targets, such as government officials posted in remote areas, high profile civilians, academicians, secularists, and journalists who were seen as unsympathetic to the cause of Islamism.

“The journalists who fight against Islamism through [the] pen will perish by [the] sword. Our Jihad consists of killing and dispersing all those who fight against God and his Prophet,” declared Layada in an underground newspaper in November 1993 (Kepel, 2002). Such attacks on civilians were aimed to enforce support in favor of Islamism and undercut support for the state through the use of terror. Terror tactics against civilians are typically employed by insurgents to undermine the influence of state and other rival groups (McCormick and Giordano, 2007).

The FIS was marginalized by the more violent groups, such as the GIA and MIA. Again, though, the extremist groups were divided amongst themselves over influence and control over the struggle (Willis, 1996, Martinez, 2000). At the same time, the tasks of the security forces were becoming more difficult since they still appeared illegitimate for having cancelled the elections in 1992. Initially, the middle class, which had supported the FIS over the FLN as a result of the latter’s inability to run a clean government, reacted by refusing to cooperate with the security forces. The initial non-cooperation with the security forces was also the result of economic reforms initiated by the military regime, headed by Zeroual, with a view to containing the debt burden. These economic reforms were very unpopular as they led to shortages of essential items and to double digit inflation. But, more than these factors, the terror tactics used by the Islamists deterred people from cooperating with the security forces (Roberts, 2003).

While the regime pursued the extremists militarily, it also realized the importance of dealing with the conflict politically. It released the second tier leaders of FIS, like Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham, and opened negotiations with moderate elements of FIS and other opposition leaders. The opposition demanded a swift return to the electoral process and almost all of them demanded honoring the results of the abandoned election of 1991 - a demand not acceptable to the military regime. The negotiations failed. The regime accused the moderates of reneging on their promise to denounce violence; for their part, the released FIS leaders accused the regime of having reneged on its promise to release other leaders, including Madani and Belhadj.

The release of Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham posed a serious threat to the primacy of Mohammad Said and Abderrazak Redjam, the two prominent FIS

leaders who had managed to escape arrest, leadership. They therefore aligned themselves with the GIA, which had raised its level of violence and was now targeting FIS militants as well, with a view to expanding its area of influence. The FIS countered the GIA via its own armed wing, the *Arme Islamiques du Salut* (AIS) under the leadership of Chebouti. AIS was made up of old elements of the MIA and a number of independent groups.

Sensing that the political and military initiatives were beginning to shift toward the FIS, the GIA stepped up its violence, especially against rival militant outfits. It also initiated a campaign against foreigners. The GIA also announced the formation of a Caliphate on August 26, 1994, asserting that the Caliphate would manage the affairs of the ummah in accordance with divine law. The extreme nature of the GIA, however, increasingly led people to favor the FIS and AIS; it made the latter look more moderate and pragmatic both to the people and to the regime. At the same time, the failure of the FIS to be able to exert any control or influence over the GIA reduced its legitimacy in the eyes of the regime, as any agreement with the FIS would not likely bear fruit in so far as the GIA was concerned and the GIA could continue its violent struggle. The regime, however, continued its peace overtures to the FIS minus its radical agenda, and simultaneously adopted a tough stance towards the ultra violent groups.

This dual strategy resulted in winning the support of the moderate elements of the FIS, who were gradually being marginalized and targeted by more violent groups. Meanwhile, the political parties, including the FLN and FIS, evolved a unified strategy in a meeting that took place in Rome in the autumn of 1994. The accord was finally signed in January 1995 supporting creation of a platform for a political and peaceful solution to the Algerian crisis. The FIS affirmed its resolve to distance itself from violence. The FIS also shifted its equivocal stance on democracy vis-à-vis rule by divine law. It proclaimed respect for the alteration of power through universal suffrage and for popular legitimacy and guarantees of fundamental liberties to individuals and groups regardless of race, sex, faith, and language. This fundamental shift in the FIS's platform paved the way for elections later in the year. However, the FIS's demand to have a broader dialogue among its various leaders, including those still in jails, and the extremists led to a breakdown in

the dialogue between the regime and the political parties. The regime, however, went ahead with the election, which was carried out under strict security and despite disruptions by the extremists.

The election was mainly a contest between Zeroual, propped up by the regime, and Mahfoud Nahnah, a leading figure of the Islamic movement since 1960. There were allegations of rigging and fraud. However, Hugh Roberts, the author of *The Battlefield Algeria 1988 – 2002*, has argued that the elections were still “impressively fair” (Roberts, 2003, p. 192). Real victory rested in conducting them peacefully. The initial cynical reaction to Zeroual’s victory gave way to gradual acceptance, probably since the people of Algeria, essentially the middle class – government employees and the merchants – were tired of extortion by the extremists. This forced the FIS and other opposition parties to change their attitude toward Zeroual’s regime.

In the wake of his win, Zeroual announced a general pardon for the armed extremists. This move paid immediate dividends as many armed extremists surrendered, deserting the resistance. The FIS, on its part, offered a unilateral truce in return for the release of Belhadj. With the AIS already having declared a truce with the security forces, the GIA was forced on the defensive. It responded by raising the level of violence to the genocidal level. Village after village was wiped out by the GIA, who declared Jihad against everyone who was not supporting their cause. The GIA particularly targeted those groups or individuals who tried to build bridges between the regime and the Islamists (Willis, 1996, p. 323). This insane violence, however, proved counter-productive.

Meanwhile, Zetoul, the GIA’s emir, killed Said and Mekhlouf, who had defected from the FIS to the GIA, calling them the moles of FIS who were trying to take over control of the GIA. The killing led to the breakup of the GIA and its support among Islamists internationally. The Al Jihad of Egypt, for instance, criticized the GIA, blaming it for shedding forbidden blood of fellow Jihadi leaders. Meanwhile, continuous pressure by the military led many to surrender, though some splinter groups remain, the most important one being the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which has aligned itself with Al Qaeda in 2003. Overall, however, marginalization of the extremists

by the security forces has brought many political groups to the mainstream fold. The result was participation of political parties of all hues in the elections held in 1999 and 2004.

D. ASSESSMENT

Islam played a central role in the Algerian liberation war against France. Though the FLN, that fought the liberation war included leaders of all hues, including leftists, nationalists, and Islamists, it did use Islam to mobilize people in the war against their colonial masters. After liberation, the FLN adopted the Soviet model for governance. The Islamists felt betrayed. They rejected socialism as foreign model, and insisted on a “return to Arab-Islamic roots” – the slogan for the liberation war - and implementation of Sharia.

Though Arabization and Islam that formed the ideological motivation for the liberation war did remain the focus of Algeria’s political leaders, the extent of Islamization remained a bone of contention between the Islamists and the FLN. The lack of democratic institutions meant that there was no forum for public discourse other than the inviolable mosques. Thus, in effect, the voice of dissent could be heard only from religious scholars and leaders. In the mid-1980s, when oil prices plummeted and the state was no longer able to give people the largesse by which to buy political peace, it lost legitimacy to the only other public forum in the country, that is the mosques. Islamism became the only alternative to FLN rule.

The distinction between moderate and extremist Islamists was always blurry in Algeria, including in the FIS. While FIS head Abbassi Madani, a veteran of the war for national liberation, was circumspect in his statements and gave the impression that he had no quarrel with democracy, his deputy, Belhadj, was forthright in declaring that democracy was not their objective, but only a means to gain power and implement Sharia rule. “Democracy is a stranger in the House of God...There is no democracy in Islam. There exists only shura with its rules and constraints... We are not a nation that thinks in terms of majority-minority. The majority does not express the truth (William, 1996).” On many occasions Belhadj equated democracy with unbelief. While Belhadj was ready to

take part in elections and use the same to come to power, he did not believe in elections either. “If people voted against the law of God...this is nothing other than blasphemy. The ulama will order death of the offenders who have substituted their authority for that of God” (Willis, 1996, pp. 144-45). Thus, Belhaj adopted moderate means as a tactic to achieve radical changes. He was not averse to violence as is evident from his statement after he was imprisoned that had he been free he would have joined the army of Emir Chebouti, which was fighting an armed struggle with the state. In contrast, Madani used radicals and the violence as a bargaining chip against the military regime.

There were many takers for Behadj's views as is apparent from the huge attendance at the Friday prayers he led. On other occasions, Belhadj declared, “In Islam sovereignty belonged to the Divine Law, in democracy the sovereignty belongs to the people to the mob, the charlatans” (Willis 1996, p. 199). Hachemi Sahnouni, the FIS's second vice president, stated in 1991 that if the FIS came to power they would suspend the constitution and ban the socialists and secular parties and apply sharia. Such statements reflect the influence of Al Banna and Qutb on the FIS's leadership. It was these statements that had alerted the military in the first place. When the first phase of the elections confirmed the military's fear that the FIS would not only win the election but could also win more than a two-thirds majority that would enable it to change the constitution the military acted swiftly.

The Islamist movement in Algeria was disorganized, though persistent till 1989. With the formation of the FIS, Islamists of various hues had a bigger platform from which to voice their views. The economic decline and corruption in the FLN had disenchanted its major supporters, the middle class and the merchants. The urban poor were already with the FIS. This made the FIS a formidable alternative power base. Yet, there were divisions in the Islamists' movement. There were leaders like Nahnah and Soltani who believed that Dawa should precede the quest for Islamic rule. On the other hand, many Islamists felt that Islamic rule could only be brought about if the Islamists were in power – though they differed as to the tactics to be used for getting power.

Madani, for instance, advocated the ballot box while Bouyali and his supporters felt that neither Dawa nor the ballots would ensure the Islamic rule; Jihad was the only way to achieve an Islamic state.

The Algerian civil war was an armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamic rebels. The rebels not only fought the government forces, they also killed secular intellectuals, journalists, foreigners, and ordinary civilians, at times wiping out entire families and villages. It is estimated to have cost more than 100,000 lives (Hafez, 2003: p 1) including more than 70 journalists and many foreigners. The conflict began in December 1991, when the Government cancelled the election after the first round results had shown that the FIS would win, citing fears that the FIS would end democracy. After the FIS was banned, several thousand activists began an armed campaign against the government. Islamists formed several armed groups. The two major groups were the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA) based in the mountains and the Armed Islamic Group based in the towns. The guerillas initially targeted the army and the police. But some groups soon started targeting civilians.

The exclusion of reformists for a prolonged period in Algeria made way for the radicals to take over the movement. There was division in the movement not only between the moderates and the radicals, but also amongst the radicals. Abbasi Madani, one of the two fiery preachers of the FIS, assured his followers that democracy would be preserved and that the Islamic *al shura* permitted various parties to participate in the elections. On the other hand his deputy, Ali Belhaj, described democracy as heresy and underscored the sanctity of Sharia as the only divine rule for governance of the state. He rejected majority rule and declared that truth is not measured by counting votes but by the divine revelations given in the Koran and religious books.

The government was able to control the insurgency by a carrot and stick policy. The government offered amnesty to the guerrillas, many guerrillas surrendered their arms. Those who did not were hunted down and killed. The government was ruthless in dealing with those extremists who had refused to lay down arms. The security forces killed the third and fourth commanders of the GIA and three of its lieutenants (Hafez, 2003). The state formed citizen militias to expand the fight against the Islamist insurgents

and sealed the border. The military coordinated with Tunisia to patrol their border jointly to prevent the movement of arms and rebels. Extrajudicial killings and widespread torture were employed to terrorize the terrorists (Hafez, 2003). By the 2000 the main guerrilla groups had either been destroyed or surrendered. The Islamist parties' popularity declined mainly because of the violence unleashed by the guerrillas. In the 2004, presidential election the Islamist candidate Abdallah Jaballah came in a distant third with only 5% of the vote (Kepel, 2002, p. 262) although government forces were also accused of brutality and the killing civilians.

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V. PAKISTAN: THE JOURNEY FROM A STATE FOR MUSLIMS TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Three countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan - have undergone profound changes as a result of the USA's post-9/11 war on terror; the first two for challenging the U.S. and Pakistan, ironically, for being its ally in the war on terror. The extremists are baying for Musharraf's blood for having betrayed them and the liberals are asking for his resignation because he usurped democracy and brought war to Pakistan on order from the White House. Meanwhile, security forces find themselves having to tackle peaceful protests on the streets of Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi. They also fight Islamist militias in the hostile terrain of NWFP. The Islamists, for their part, are attacking the security forces with impunity. The Pakistani military is losing ground in FATA. Swat has been wrested away by the Islamic army of Fazalullah, the cleric from Swat. Having said all this, growth of Islamism in Pakistan is not sudden, but rooted in its birth and nurtured and nourished by successive regimes – both civilian and military.

A. CREATION OF PAKISTAN

Mohammed Ali Jinnah's two nation theory – positing that Muslims and Hindus are two different nations who cannot live together – was aimed at saving Muslims from Hindu domination. Jinnah's demand for proportionate representation for Muslims in the government in independent India was rejected by the Congress Party as a communal demand. The Congress believed in secular, liberal democracy based on universal adult suffrage. The idea of proportional representation was inimical to Congress, an organization molded in the western liberal philosophy. Many in the Muslim League, including Jinnah, viewed the universal adult suffrage as a ploy by Congress to attain a Hindu Raj, for the Hindus were in the overwhelming majority. The Muslim psyche, Rajmohan Gandhi (1986, p. 10) has observed was informed by a deep belief in the close nexus between state and religion. For Muslims, Islam is both the religion and the polity. Such a belief is based on the 650 years of Muslim rule in India. The rulers often derived their legitimacy from statements by clerics. This refusal by Congress to accept the ML's demand for proportionate representation for Muslims led to the demand for a separate

country for the Muslims, namely Pakistan. However, there were very few Muslims who were enthused with the idea of Pakistan, and many who openly opposed it – some for secular reasons and others because it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent and weaken them still further. Also Baloch, Sindhis, and Pushtuns never wanted to be part of Pakistan (Weaver, 2003, p. 93). Tellingly, the Muslim League was routed in the elections of 1937; it could muster less than 5% of the seats, with the seats reserved for Muslims going to Congress or other local parties.

Jinnah consequently felt forced to invoke the slogan of “Islam under threat” to unite the Muslims and bring them under the fold of the Muslim League. This slogan galvanized the Mullahs (the Muslim clerics), who were hitherto opposed to the idea of Pakistan because it was being propounded by secularists, to canvass for the Muslim League during the 1946 election. The Maulvis and Mullahs have tremendous influence over Muslims in South Asia. “An average Muslim turns to the local Maulvi when he is in doubt about some point of conduct or when he is entangled in dispute” writes Arun Shourie in his book *The world of Fatwas* describing who issues the Fatwas and how they are followed (Shourie, 1995, p. 1). Mullahs told Muslims in India that it was unreligious not to vote for the Muslim League (Haqqani, 2004). The result was an overwhelming victory for the Muslim League in Muslim dominated states like Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, and NWFP. While Jinnah was fighting for a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, many of the Muslim League lower level workers were selling ideas of a religious state for Muslims (Chengappa, 2001). Thus, unwittingly (or reluctantly?) Jinnah, the secularist, depended on the critical help of the Muslim clerics in realizing his dream for a separate homeland for Muslims. The result of this early critical dependence on Mullahs was the statement from Jinnah that Pakistan would follow the principles of Islam (Chengappa, 2001).

B. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

Though Jinnah had used the slogan of “Islam under threat” to rally the Muslims under the Muslim League umbrella, he had no intention of creating a theocratic Pakistan. He envisioned a multiethnic, multi-religious, liberal, democratic Pakistan. He convened

the Constituent Assembly with the following words, “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state” (Abbas, 2004, p. 18). Unfortunately, Jinnah did not live long enough to see the Constituent Assembly finalize the constitution for the new country. He died on October 11, 1948. The Mullahs, who had enjoyed influence and power during the Mughal empire, but were sidelined by the British with the introduction of modern education and the court system, saw the opportunity to redeem their fortune in this new country that was created in the name of Islam (Nawab, 2007). They insisted on giving the constitution an Islamic orientation. They formed an important pressure group as a result of their contributions, particularly during the last phase of the movement for the creation Pakistan (Waseem, 2004, p. 21). The result was that the Objective Resolution that came out in 1949 enjoined that the state be governed in accordance with the requirements of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Koran and Sunnah. The secularists suffered a further setback when the Constitution of 1956 declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic and assigned different rights of citizenships to Muslims and non-Muslims; the latter could not become the Prime Minister or the President. The foundation for the Islamic Republic was laid.

The initial win by Islamists like Maududi had come after a six year long duel in the Constituent Assembly with the moderates, who wanted a secular Constitution as envisioned by Jinnah, the founder of the state. Justice Brohi who opposed the Islamization of the Constitution, was threatened with ex-communication (Hassan Abbas, 2004). The fear of ex-communication and being labeled non-Muslim prevented moderates from speaking against Maududi. The Islamists succeeded in adding Islamic Provisions to the Constitution that came out in 1956. The Constitution provided for having an Islamic Council to recommend laws that were congruent with the Koran and Sunnah (Chengappa, 2001). The Islamists never looked back from this point on.

The Constitution written in 1973 under the civilian regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Berkeley educated socialist, retained the provisions of the earlier Constitutions, and

introduced the provisions for formation of an Islamic Council consisting of Islamic scholars. The Islamic Council has the mandate to examine all laws and bring them into conformity with Islamic laws. In addition to allowing this, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succumbed to the long standing demand by religious parties like Jamat e Islami and Jamat e Ulema Islam to declare Ahmediyyas, a sect of Muslim, as non Muslims because some of their beliefs are at variance with the tenets of Islam.

General Zia, who deposed Bhutto in a coup in 1977, introduced Islamism in all spheres of life. He introduced Sharia courts to adjudicate cases based on Sharia Law, thus empowering the clergy. He also promulgated the Blasphemy Act that became a tool for harassing not only minorities, but also for silencing dissent within the community. The Hudood Act, meanwhile, was blatantly anti-women. As per the Hudood Act, a woman who charges someone of rape has to arrange at least four male eyewitnesses to give evidence in her favor or else she can be punished for fornication.

C. THE STATE RESPONSE TO ISLAMISM

Ever since Pakistan was carved out of India as a separate homeland for Muslims, Islam has remained at the centre of nationalist discourse. The government has used a pan-Islamic ideology for countering all demands for provincial autonomy, with the demands for autonomy being portrayed as a threat to national unity. But for a brief period in the early 1960s, when Gen Ayub Khan banned the Jamat e Islami for demanding to name Pakistan as Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the state in Pakistan has always buckled under to the pressure of Islamists, and ever more so because of the expedient behavior of politicians. Not even Ayub's confrontation lasted very long time. The new Constitution that he brought out in 1962 was amended and in 1963 Pakistan was renamed an Islamic Republic (Abbas, 2004, p. 30).

Ayub's successor, General Yahya Khan called upon the Islamists to douse the separatist movement in what was then East Pakistan. These Islamists worked hand in hand with the military to persecute the Bengalis (East Pakistanis) who were fighting for liberation from the domination of West Pakistan (Markey, 2007, Foreign Affairs, p. 90). Yahya was responsible for transforming Islamists from being merely a pressure group

speaking from the pulpits of mosques to mainstream politics. With a view to countering socialist, Zulfikar Bhutto in the west and the nationalist Mujib ur Rahaman in the east, Yahya encouraged Jamat e Islami and Jamate Ulema Islam to contest elections held in 1970. The religious parties won 18 seats in the election.

Bhutto (1971-1977), the charismatic leader from Sindh province, who came to power after the 1971 dismemberment of the country, also courted the Islamists out of political expediency. In fact it was during his tenure that the Islamists were able to have the Ahmediyyas declared non-Muslim. Bhutto strengthened the Islamic identity not only out of domestic political compulsion, but also to forge ties with the oil rich Gulf States. He tried to project Pakistan as a leader of the Islamic world (Lovoy, 2004). But even so the state did not pursue the policy of Islamizing the whole society. Zia is the leader who changed this policy most profoundly. He started the process of Islamizing Pakistan in all spheres of life - legal, education, social, military, and strategic.

Zia ul Haq was a die-hard Islamist who believed that democracy had no role in an Islamic country. He argued that Islam could provide the identity that Pakistan was desperately looking for. Apart from legislative changes, such as the introduction Shariah Courts, the Blasphemy Act, and the Hudood Act, Zia also ordered deduction of *zakat* from individuals' bank accounts. He used this money for setting up more madaris (Talbot, 2005), the religious schools which teach an orthodox, doctrinaire version of Islam. In 1984, Zia passed a law that made it a criminal offence for Ahmediyyas to call themselves Muslim (Ispahani, 2004).

Zia also Islamized the civilian administration, educational institutes, the military, and the Inter Services Intelligence. Officers adhering to a strict regimen of Islam were promoted while secular-minded professionals were ignored. Islamic training and philosophy were made mandatory parts of the curriculum in the military training programs (Hussain, 2007, p. 19). During his tenure evaluation reports of military and civilian officers included a box for comments on the officer's religious sincerity (Abbas, 2004). One of Zia's aide, Brigadier Malik, whose book *Quranic Concepts of War* was made mandatory in military curricula, called for the revival of the spirit of Jihad and

suggested compulsory military training for all men and women (Cohen, 2004, p. 171). Islamism was introduced in the social system by continuously propagating the same via the electronic and print media (Zahid Hussain, 2007, p. 19).

Islamism in Pakistan turned from political to militant as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Islamic revolution in Iran gave rise to the growth of Shiism in Pakistan, a country with a 15-25% Shia population. The Wahabi and Sunni organizations geared up to take on the challenge posed by the Iranian revolution. The militant Shia and Sunni organizations soon indulged in assassination of each other's political leaders and the killing of children and innocent people praying in mosques. In 1988 Sunnis killed 150 Shii. In the same year, in a separate incident Shia leader Arif Mohammad was killed. The Shii responded by killing Haqnawaz Jhangvy, the leader of Sipaha Sahaba, a militant Sunni organization. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan the frontline ally of the USA in the war against the communists. Ironically, it was the U.S. which used Islam to challenge the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan. The Afghan warriors were called Mujahideens, the fighters for Islam.

The war in Afghanistan gave Zia both the finances for Islamizing Pakistan and the opportunity to use Islamism for strategic aims. The funds given by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were used to open more madaris and train Jihadis for fighting in Afghanistan and, at the same time, pursuing nuclear weapons technology. This increased funding and state support led to the rapid proliferation of Islamist organizations of various hues. Jamat e Islami which was gradually making inroads in the civil and military bureaucracies, was soon left behind by the more conservative and radical Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam. The latter belongs to the conservative Deoband school of Islamic thoughts (Zahab and Roy, 2004). Another religious organization that came to prominence during the 1980s is Ahl-i-Hadith. This organization follows the Saudis' Wahhabi form of Islam.

Soon these organizations competed for the considerable Saudi and U.S. funds that were routed to them through the ISI for recruiting and training Mujahideen to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. There was a sudden spurt in the growth of Madaris all over the country teaching Jihadi ideology. However, these militant organizations did not restrict

their operations just to Afghanistan. Sipah- e Sahaba and Lashkar e Jhangvi, the militant wings of JUI, indulged in sectarian violence and targeted Shia (Nasr, 2000). The militants belonging to Lashkar e Toiba, Jaish e Mohammad, and Harkat ul Ansar crossed the Line of Control and indulged in subversive and terrorist actions in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India with the aim of liberating Kashmiris (Talbot, 2007, p. 165).

The death of Gen Zia in an air crash brought democracy and a civilian administration back to Pakistan. However, the military warned the civilian administration to refrain from interfering in the military's policies in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and regarding nuclear weapons, which were considered vital for the national security of the country (Zahab and Roy, 2004). The democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief toed the line dictated by the military. They could ill afford to antagonize the Islamists who were the Mujahideen in the eyes of the military. Their attempts to audit madaris' accounts or to stop the military training in the madaris, met violent protests from the Ulema, and the military refused to support the government (Waseem, 2004). For General Aslam Begh, who succeeded Zia as Army Chief, and Lt Gen Hamid Gul, who was the chief of the ISI in 1989, Islam was their ideology and Jihad their instrument for pursuing national security interests. They actively promoted pro-Pakistan warlords in Afghanistan and supported Muslim separatists in Eritrea, Arakan (Myanmar), South Philippines, Xinxiang in China, and Kashmir in India. They not only actively pursued the acquisition of nuclear technology, but also were also keen on sharing the same with the oil rich Muslim states (Cohen, 2004, p. 172).

Not only were their attempts to control Islamists feeble, but neither Nawaz Sharief nor Benazir Bhutto lost an opportunity to outdo each other in wooing the Islamists to bolster their Islamic legitimacy (Talbot, 2007, p. 165). Benazir's Pakistan People's Party entered into a formal alliance with the Deobandi Jamat Ulema Islami (JUI) and Sipah – i – Sahaba, a militant Sunni organization, in Punjab. Members of the SSP secured ministerial posts in the provincial Government (Zahab and Roy, 2004). The Taliban, believed to be a brainchild of Benazir's Interior Minister, Nassirullah Babar a Pushtun, were created to counter Hekmatyar and other warlords whom Pakistan had supported through the war against the Soviets and the subsequent civil war, but who the

defected to Rabbani's camp. Hekmatyar became Rabbani's Prime Minister. Rabbani was believed to be close to Iran and India. The Pakistani military and the ISI started giving full support to the Taliban with a view to overthrow Rabbani and Hekmatyar (Khan, 2003).

When Sharief came back to power in 1996, his attempts to secure his position vis a vis the military included wooing the Islamists by introducing a bill making Sharia a part of Pakistan's constitution (Cohen, 2004, p. 173). The close ties between Islamists and Nawaz Sharief's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) were seen as a threat by the Pakistani military. The military responded by increasing radicalization amongst the Islamists to undermine Sharief. The sectarian violence threatened to tear the country apart. More than 200 people died in the fight between Shia and Sunni militias (Nasr, 2000).

The Kargil fiasco in 1999 brought Nawaz into direct confrontation with the military and led to his dramatic removal by Musharraf. This war however, once again underlined the close association between the military and the Islamic fundamentalists, as the soldiers from the Northern Light Infantry were fighting the Indian forces alongside the Mujahideen atop the Kargil peaks (Musharraf, 2006, p. 90). The blowback of militancy in the form of sectarian violence in Pakistan was becoming a serious concern. Talibanization of the NWFP was gaining momentum. Musharraf found he had to withdraw his proposal to amend the Blasphemy Act under pressure from the Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA) and the clerics. Calibrating Islamic militancy so as to make it work for Pakistan's strategic objectives in Afghanistan and India without harming its own security was proving difficult. Yet, military commanders were not ready to give up the perceived strategic advantage obtained in Afghanistan by supporting the Taliban and the strategic gains made against India in Kashmir by sending the Jihadi forces across the border.

The 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda and subsequent tough talk by the U.S. administration (such as "You are either with us or against us" and the threat of being bombed back to Stone Age) made the Pakistani military leaders rethink their strategy of supporting the Islamists (Lavoy, 2004; Musharraf, 2006, p. 201). They feared that antagonizing the U.S. could jeopardize their nuclear program and also make Pakistan a

pariah state. This forced Musharraf to advocate enlightened moderation. Unfortunately for him there are few takers for this moderation within his own army and fewer still in the powerful ISI. If Musharraf had to retreat on his proposal to amend the Blasphemy Act (and to make it look more humane) under the pressure of Mullahs (Waseem, 2004, p. 23), he is not able to go full throttle against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the FATA or NWFP for fear of rebellion by his own forces (Zahid Hussain, 2007). His commanders are reluctant to fully disassociate themselves from the Taliban for ideological reasons as well as for fear of reviving the Pushtun rebellion and increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan. The ISI is still supporting Taliban commanders sympathetic to Pakistan's objectives (Abbas, 2007). It is not clear whether decision to withdraw support from the Taliban is a temporary tactical move or a strategic shift in policy for good.

D. MODERATE VOICES FROM CIVIL SOCIETY:

Prolonged authoritarian military rule in Pakistan has stifled the growth of civil society in Pakistan. Given the limited political space, civil society in Pakistan has a limited impact on policymaking. Intermittent civilian governments were busy saving themselves from the powerful military and had no time to build civil institutions. The judiciary, for its part, has found it expedient or necessary to back the unconstitutional maneuvers of Pakistani leaders even when this has involved justifying military rule, abrogation of the Constitution, and proclamation of Provisional Constitutions (Bajoria, 2007). Therefore, there are very few moderate voices that are audible in Pakistan, for the moderates face threats not only from the radicals, but also from the regimes. For instance, human-rights activist Asma Jehangir has always been under threat from the clerics and now Musharraf has placed her under house arrest. Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology – the body that ensures that laws in Pakistan are in accord with Islamic law, is widely renowned for his reading of the Koran , which he says dictates against gender discrimination or the Jihad declared by Al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations He challenges retrograde stances on the penal code for rape and adultery and he does so with a 'fundamentalist' approach – quoting the Koran or prophetic traditions. Ghamidi wants religious scholars to return to their classical role as teachers and preachers and to shun politics. However, even Ghamidi has limitations. He

acknowledges that Muslim states cannot be theocracies yet they also cannot be divorced from Islam. He argues for active investment by states in institutions that would create truly Islamic democracy (Wikipedia, ND).

Moderates like Ghamidi have not gone unnoticed by the radicals. Ghamidi received death threats from Islamists and one of his lieutenants – the editor of journal *Ishraq* published by Al Mawrid where most of Ghamidi's writings appear - was shot by the radicals (Mufti, 2007).

There are other voices of moderation that challenge the conservative interpretation of Islam, for example the call against the edict (fatwa) of Maulana Fazlullah, who has declared that education of girls is un-Islamic. Several thousand parents in the villages of Swat have withdrawn their daughters from public schools, not on the advice of Fazlullah, but because his militia has bombed four schools (Montero, 2007). But dissenting views against such fatwas are published only in English papers that have no bearing on the uneducated masses (Abbas, 2004 and Anwar , 2007). Nor does the state counter such fatwas by quoting Quranic edicts that *do* allow women to acquire knowledge.

Murtaza Razvi (2007) has lamented the increasing reliance on the ideology of Islam as propagated by Zia. He reminds his countrymen that the fabled ideal of Madina lasted barely thirty years, outdone by those wishing to build empires and establish royal lineages.

Nonetheless there has been some encouraging developments. Passage of the Women's Protection Bill by parliament, albeit with support from the PPP, and against threats made by the MMA (the conglomerate of religious parties) has yet again shown that moderate elements can have their say (Anonymous, 2007). Cohen has argued that Pakistan is still a Constitutional state, where religious extremism is restricted to a few pockets in the NWFP and FATA. However, if the government in Pakistan does not take immediate steps to improve public education and the Employment Schemes for youth, more and more are likely to join the extremist groups (Cohen, 2003).

The operation to flush out militants from the Lal Mosque in July 2007 has sharply divided moderates and extremists in Pakistan. While the moderates have praised Musharraf's tough actions against the religious bigots, the extremists have called for Jihad against Pakistani security forces. This summons was followed by the tribal chiefs unilaterally terminating the peace agreement with the government (Bokhari, 2007) and renewed terrorist attacks on security forces and official buildings in the NWFP (CBS News, 2007).

E. ASSESSMENT

In Pakistan, the rise of Islamism is a legacy of partition and subsequent attempts to consolidate an Islamic identity, not only to help bridge its ethnic divisions, but also with a view to get closer to other Islamic states in the Middle East. Also, to pursue its strategic agenda Islamist radicals were guided and supported by the Pakistani regime to achieve three objectives – one, to use Islam to keep the growing Shiism in check in the wake of Islamic revolution in Iran; two, to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan; and three, to wage Jihad in Kashmir (Zahab and Roy, 2004).

Jihadism in Pakistan is the result of the official policy to use Jihad as an instrument by which to make strategic gains in Afghanistan and against the arch rival India (Hussain Haqqani, 2005). The growth of Islamic parties in Pakistan was initially funded by Gulf countries in their attempt to ward off the Left and the growing Shiism (Nasr, 2005). Thus, we can say radical Islamic movements became instruments in the hands of Pakistani authorities to further their internal as well as regional policies. Though Islamists had started showing their clout immediately after the country came into being, they were far from being a force to reckon with. Their influence was restricted to street politics and demonstrations. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 ended the idea of Pakistan as the homeland for all of south Asia's Muslims. This dismemberment was seen as a warning about further disintegration of the country. The government responded by turning to Islam to overcome ethnic and linguistic divisions.

Militant Islamism tasted its first fruits of success in the Afghanistan war. The war not only created the seamless Islamic bond between Afghans and Pakistan, but also

subsumed the Pushtun nationalism that used to haunt the regime in Pakistan (Weaver, 2003, p. 79). The Afghan war added another dimension to the growth of Islamism – it made Islam a tool for pursuing foreign policy and strategic agendas. While the SSP and Afghan mujahideen carried out their activities in Afghanistan, the Harkat ul Ansar (later called the Harkat ul Mujahideen), Lashkar e Toiba, and Jaish e Mohammad concentrated their activities in Kashmir and other parts of India. The consequence of increasing fundamentalism was a rise in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Jaish-e-Mohammad participated in violence against the Christian minority in Pakistan, with attacks on the Christian Hospital at Taxila and the church in the Diplomatic enclave in Islamabad. Lashkar e Jhangvi and Sipah e Sahaba, for their part, unleashed a trail of violence against Shia, killing hundreds of innocent people, between late 1980s to mid 90s.

The Iraq war has bogged down the U.S. forces in Iraq with Afghanistan receiving scant resources. This has granted the Taliban the chance to regroup. A re-emerging Taliban swiftly received help from the ISI, which had reluctantly distanced itself on instructions from Musharraf. Realizing that the U.S. cannot be depended upon and that it has to fend for itself in the region has caused Pakistan to rethink its calculus (Weaver, 2003, p. 278). In retrospect it appears that Musharraf's decision to abandon the Taliban was a mere tactical move aimed at avoiding U.S. wrath. Even if his intentions were as stated, his capabilities are not. Within the army, split between Islamists and non-Islamists are becoming more and more pronounced.

While the successive military and civilian administrations have tried to woo / outflank the Islamists by Islamizing the administration and society, the Islamist radicals, like Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Mullah Fazlullah, and Maulana Massod Azhar of Jaish e Mohammad are not yet satisfied. They are not ready to accept anything short of Taliban-like Islamic rule. These radicals, guided by Mawdudi's and Qutb's teachings, are virulently anti-western. Today, Islamists are openly challenging the army. Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri are believed to be hiding somewhere in the North West area of Pakistan. It seems no exaggeration to say that the moderate voices in Pakistan have been systemically silenced.

Over 20 years of a growing symbiotic relationship between the Pakistani military and the Islamists cannot be broken abruptly. Musharraf, who started his reign with a statement promising to keep Pakistan from becoming a theocratic state, is gradually losing control over his forces. There is growing opposition to his policies to support American forces, abandoning the Taliban and reigning in LeT and JeM who were actively involved in waging the proxy war in Kashmir and other parts of India. Some of his officers are colluding with the radicals. The pressure on Musharraf from within his own military is quite apparent from the following flip flop. On January 12, 2002 he declared, “No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir.” However, facing pressure from his military he went back on this declaration and insisted that Kashmir militants could not be termed as terrorists. Meanwhile Taliban fighters are freely crossing the Afghan – Pakistan Border. There is also speculation that the assassination attempts on Musharraf were carried out with the collusion of the ISI (Zahid Hussain, 2007).

For their part, the moderates who had hailed the military’s ouster of Nawaz Sharief are similarly growing disillusioned with Musharraf. The military regime has not only failed to control extremism, it has failed to bring about the promised democracy. Musharraf’s attempt to replace Iftikhar Chaudhary and install a more pliable Chief Justice, met with strong opposition and eventually Chaudhary had to be reinstated. This has exposed the chinks in Musharraf’s armor and demonstrates that he is facing growing opposition not only from the religious extremists but also from liberals fighting for democracy (Amir, 2007).

If Pakistan is to come out of the hole that it has dug for itself, politicians and military will have to stop using Islamists as tools of its regional policy - a tall order considering Pakistan’s deep rooted sense of insecurity. Pakistan has to contend with a much stronger India in the East, Shia Iran in the West and the ever restive Balochis, Sindhis, and Pushtuns, smarting under Punjabi domination, within its own borders. Widely held beliefs that democracy and the installation of a civilian regime could isolate the radicals have proved ill-founded.

With over 5 million personal arms in the hands of militants (Hussain Haqqani, 2000) the extremists are a force to be reckoned with as they would not hesitate to use these to terrorize the authorities into submission. The Pakistani army learnt this bitter lesson when it lost 700 soldiers fighting the Taliban and other extremists in Waziristan. This loss led to a face-saving agreement with the tribal leaders. Now that the tribal leaders have unilaterally ended that agreement, Musharraf has no alternative but to take on these radicals and disarm them, lest this region declares full autonomy and impose a Talibansque regime in the area (Irfan Hussain, 2007). The first step therefore should be to disarm these radicals (Haqqani, 2004).

However, the military can only help make conditions more conducive to good governance. It cannot by itself meet the needs of the people that would come in the long run from democracy and good governance. The feudal structure will have to be dismantled by instituting land reform and empowering the people. The security concerns that eat up one third of the country's revenue need to be addressed so that enough funds are released for education and health if the government (civilian or military) is to gain legitimacy (Tanveer Ahmed Khan, 2006). This would also mean the military taking a back seat to the civilian administration, an unlikely event.

The recent declaration of emergency by Musharraf as Chief of the Army Staff, and not as President, underscores the role the military rightfully considers its own. The emergency was declared with the objective to fight the terrorists unrestrained by the courts. However, the fact that 28 terrorists were released in exchange for 200 soldiers taken captive by the Islamists the day the emergency was declared does not gel with the stated objectives. Nor does the fact that the two judges (Khokhar and Abbasi), who had released the Lal Masjid terrorists, are also judges who continue to sit in the revamped Supreme Court (Ayaz Amir, 2007). If the U.S. backed alliance between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf was not likely to work prior to the emergency, it is now even more unlikely to work since Musharraf has not stopped playing a double game. Yet, if he does not, he runs the risk of the military splitting along ethnic lines since the Islamists and non Islamists are now divided along sectarian lines with Balochis and Pushtuns being the prime supporters of the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Friedman, 2007). Worth noting is that

Pushtuns constitute 18% of the Pakistani army. The surrender of over 200 troops to Fazallulah's forces in Swat has already set the military strategists thinking about the game Musharraf is playing.

The above discussion throws up several questions but for now I will offer three observations. First, mere slogan of enlightened moderation cannot change the ground realities in Pakistan. The leaders have to stop playing to the religious gallery and stop using Jihadis for pursuing geostrategic objectives. Second, the route to enlightened moderation requires a wide network of schools offering modern education. Education plays an important role in molding the young; the state needs to provide alternatives to madaris, changing the curriculum of madaris will not change the environment or the focus of madaris, which is aimed more at teaching the Koran than readying the next generation to get gainful employment (Pal, 2007).

Third, 9/11 has forced the military regime to side with the U.S. in its war against terror. This has given rise to an open revolt which is evident from the attack on Musharraf's life, the seizing of Lal Masjid, and also by attacks against the soldiers particularly in the NWFP. Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri have called for all Muslims to rise against Musharraf and elements of the Pakistani military that has sided with crusading forces of Bush. Musharraf cannot win this war merely by publicizing or heeding exhortations from the moderate Islamic leaders calling for peace. The hardliners among the Islamists are not amenable to negotiation. Even the tribal leaders who are willing to negotiate get alienated by threats by the Taliban on one hand and the high handed excessive violence applied by the security forces on the other. To move beyond the current untenable situation, Musharraf has no alternative but to eliminate these hardcore Islamists who have taken up the arms against the government. However, while doing so he has to be careful that he does not cause a full-fledged rebellion against his present regime.

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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The war on terror was launched with the bombings of Afghanistan and removal of Taliban after the latter refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. It is now six years since the GWOT was launched, yet we are nowhere near winning the war. The minor gains in blocking terrorist finances and in gaining international support for the war against the Jihadis have been more than offset by the flow of recruits to the cadre of Al Qaeda and its affiliates after the invasion of Iraq (Finel and Gell, 2007). The more the U.S. forces gain ground in Afghanistan and Iraq the more recruits join the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the two are believed to have regained the strength and vigor that they had in 2001.

A. WHO ARE MODERATES?

Hamzawy (2007) and Hassan (2006) have argued that one reason why recruits are streaming into the folds of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is the ideology propounded by the Islamists and the failure of the west to effectively counter it. Kepel has posited that the present war with the Islamists is a war to win Muslim minds. The Islamists are launching attacks on the west in a bid to convince Muslims that they can win this war (Kepel, 2004)

Kepel has also argued that the present Jihad is mainly aimed at changing the moribund, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. As the Jihadis failed to get enough support for their struggle against the authoritarian regimes in their own countries, they adopted the strategy of attacking the far enemy – the U.S. and the west, which are believed to be supporting the regimes that worked more for their interests than those of their own people - making it a clash of civilizations to win the Muslim Mind and to have enough vanguards under the Banner of Mohammed to fight the regimes in the Middle East. Kepel has argued that the moderate Muslims from Europe could be of tremendous help in fighting the violent Jihad because these Muslims are gradually integrating themselves in the western culture and have reaped the benefits of the liberal west. Yet, though the European Muslims may not find Taliban-like rule attractive enough after having been exposed to the liberal west, not all have given up their deep seated bias

against western culture and many still feel tied to their native countries. They, too, blame the west for the plight of their countries. Even 2nd and 3rd generation Muslims have been radicalized in Europe (Finan, 2004). For instance, Mohammad Siddiqi, the mastermind of the 7/7 attack on the London underground, did not show any signs that he was not fully integrated into the UK culture (Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorists Attack on July 7 , 2005).

Many Muslim migrants in Europe continue to maintain strong ties with their native places and tend to be influenced by events there. They are extremely retentive of their ways. And why should they not be retentive? After all, Islam is the superior religion in their eyes, divulged by God himself to Mohammed. And the Islamic way of life must be protected and propagated (Dobrot, 2007; Tillman, 2007; Woodward. nd).

Hassan (2006) has observed that Al Qaeda and other Muslim extremist organizations are driven by the ideology of imposing Islamic rule and governance by divine laws. This ideology is predicated on selective interpretation of the religious texts, the Koran and the Hadith. He has advocated that Al Qaeda's arguments can be countered by the moderate ulama because Muslims by and large go by the theological and juristic interpretations of religious questions. Thus, the opinions of ulama carry more weight than that of other scholars. However, there are not many ulama who do not see Israel as an occupier and U.S. support to Israel as the perpetuation of atrocities against Muslims. For example, Yusuf al Qaradawi, despite his strong criticism of the 9/11 attacks and killing of civilians by Al Qaeda, is a strong advocate of suicide bombings in Israel and has anti-Semitic views. So is Amien Rais, former chairman of Mohmmadiya, a fundamentalist Islamic organization (Hassan, 2006). In an interview to the MEMRI TV, Ahmad Al Tayyib, the President of the Al Azhar university at Cairo, has justified suicide attacks against Jews (MEMRI-TV, 2007). Meanwhile the ulama in Pakistan do not have views on Kashmir that are much different from those of the Pakistani government. In other words these ulama are not un-influenced by political views.

Hassan (2006) has also cautioned that moderate Ulama will not be effective if the global Muslim grievances are not addressed. And what are these global grievances? They are the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, Russian occupation of Muslim Chechnya, India's

control over Muslim Kashmir, the right of self-determination of Muslims in southern Thailand etc. Nor does the list stop here if we include the demands made by radical organizations like Lashkar e Toiba. Although it is hard to quarrel with Hassan's suggestions to solve the Palestinian, Kashmir, and Chechnya imbroglios, there is no guarantee that Al Qaeda and its affiliates will not pursue their more grandiose ideas like reclaiming Europe, "liberating the Indian Muslims from the Hindu yoke," or fighting for their Muslim brothers who are suffering under the Catholic Philippines.

For the west and for many Muslims influenced by the western education, the present war *may* be a war on terror. However, for Islamists it is a clash of civilizations, a war between Muslims and non-Muslims.

How does one create a political firewall between moderates and radical co-religionists in this clash of civilizations, asks Simons (2006)?

B. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THE MODERATES?

Assuming that we manage to garner the support of moderate Muslims, how effective are they likely to be in this environment of conflict?

Moderate Muslims like Mansour and Tariq Ramadan speak from their safe houses in the U.S. and Switzerland. How effective are they likely to be with the man on street in Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan? Mansour had to flee Egypt and take refuge in the U.S. having taken on the might of the Islamists. The violence unleashed by the extremists makes the environment too insecure for reason to prevail. Views different from those of the radical ideologies are brutally silenced. There is intra movement competition (Martinez, 2000 and Hassan, 2003). Those who want to continue fighting sabotage the peace process and not only attack those engaged in trying to wrest concessions, but also deploy violence against civilians to undermine the influence and importance of those who are negotiating (Hafez, 2003; McCormick and Owen, 2004; McCormick and Giordano, 2007). In Algeria, the GIA not only attacked the security forces and the symbols of state, but also attacked members of FIS who advocated negotiating with the state (Hafez, 2003; Roberts, 2003). In Punjab, the 1985 Accord between the Akali Dal and Rajiv government was undermined by the killing of Harchand Singh Longowal the chief architect of the

accord from the Akali Dal side and the violence increased when the Akali Dal headed by Barnala formed a government in the state. This forced the center to remove the Barnala government on grounds of failing to provide security to the people and led to the imposition of the central rule instead (Singh, 2002).

In Algeria, the rise of the GIA and its daring attacks led to marginalization of the FIS. With a view to arresting its marginalization the FIS formed its own armed wing, the AIS, which drew personnel from MIA and other radicalized smaller factions of Islamists (Hafez, 2003, p. 117) Competition between the FIS/AIS consortium and the GIA led to a savage war between the two. The GIA killed Abedlbaqi Sahroui - a founding member of FIS – in a mosque in Paris. The GIA also killed over 100 militants belonging to Takfir wal Hijra and, in November 1995, killed Muhammad Said and Abdelrazak Rejjam for allegedly seeking to take over the organization and changing its salafiyya orientation. The execution of Said led many of the groups to leave GIA. Al Rabita al Islamiya lil Dawa wal Jiahd (LIDD) and the Larba militia declared their split from GIA. Later, the GIA's Amir Zitouni was killed in a trap set by former members of the GIA militia to avenge the killing of Said and Rejjam (Hafez, 2003, p. 119).

McCormick and Giordano (2007), in their study of insurgencies, have shown how insurgents use symbolic violence to mobilize support in their favor. Most people are willing to support the state or the insurgents conditionally, depending on the cost and benefits. This cost-benefit analysis is influenced by the probabilities they assign to each side's success (McCormick and Giordano, 2007). In the war between moderates and radicals, with the moderates speaking from the pulpits of mosques and radicals speaking through the barrels of guns, who would be the winner is a foregone conclusion. Further, the sermons of moderate Muslims like Qaradhawi and Ghamizi have never attracted the attention of Muslims as much as has the rhetoric of Bin Laden and Zawahiri. In other words, the moderates do not have the charisma to galvanize the youth (Simons, 2006). Thus, unless the state provides a secure environment for the moderates so that they can speak freely and make their presence felt, it is unlikely that most of people will listen to them and do something that would displease the radicals. Despite being unhappy with the violence unleashed by the extremists in Punjab, Sikhs preferred to remain silent and did

not cooperate with the state, until the security environment was improved and the terror unleashed by the militants was eliminated either by eliminating them or forcing them on the run. It is only when citizens believed that the state had a reasonable chance of winning that they supported the state. Moderate leaders like Longowal, Barnala, and Badal remained ambiguous while criticizing violence perpetrated by the extremists like the Khalistan Commando Force and Babbar Khalsa (Gill, 1999).

In Algeria, the moderate FIS was not willing to negotiate with the military regime. Belhaj supported the armed struggle. However, once it became clear that the resort to arms meant marginalization of the FIS at the cost of the radical GIA, the FIS agreed to negotiate. Negotiations with the FIS, however, were not effective for they had little influence with the GIA, which upped its violence with a view to sabotaging the agreement. The Algerian regime's policy of "eradication of extremists," however, finally paved the way for the moderates. Both in Algeria, as well as in the Punjab the offer of amnesty was embraced by the militants only after the state showed its resolve in dealing with the radicals firmly and even ruthlessly. The battle in Algeria and Punjab was won on the battlefield and not by behind door negotiations. Negotiations did take place, but their outcome was greatly influenced by what was happening on the battlefield. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the state has not been able to demonstrate the resolve to deal with the radical Islamists because Islamists were used as tools for pursuing foreign policy, as well as achieving strategic objectives from essentially the founding of the state.

C. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

John Arquilla feels that the war on terror, ill advised as it was for being a waged against a tactic rather than an enemy, is increasingly becoming pointless and leading to unending strife. He has advocated negotiations – because networks of terrorists are harder to fight. "Doing battle with them [networks] requires inventing new tactics that radically differ from those we traditionally employ against national armies," posits Arquilla (2005). Arquilla has suggested that the U.S. should negotiate with Al Qaeda in exchange for U.S. withdrawal from the Muslim lands. The suggestions for withdrawal do make sense, but suggestions for negotiating with Al Qaeda are ill founded, because negotiation

may stop the attacks on U.S. interests and citizens, but Al Qaeda and the Taliban will not stop fighting for Islamic rule in Pakistan and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Nor is it likely to stop fighting in Kashmir and Chechnya or for that matter in Thailand, where Muslims are under non Muslim rule. If the U.S. negotiated with Al Qaeda, would it then abandon support to its erstwhile allies who fought the war on terror until now or will it continue to support them clandestinely? How can such support remain secret?

It is U.S. support to regimes in the Middle East (and also support to Israel) that compelled Al Qaeda to wage war against the U.S. For the U.S. and its allies this may be a war against the terror, for the Islamists it a religious war (Dobrot, 2007) not only against the West, but also against the apostate regimes in the Muslim countries. Al Qaeda has grand delusions about Islam dominating the world and reclaiming Europe, which the Islamists believe is comprised of Muslim land, unfairly taken away by the Christians. Religious wars always tend to be brutal and last long (Toft, 2007).

D. WAR OR INSURGENCY

As long as this is a religious war, it is unlikely that moderates can play any role in moderating the Jihadis, because moderates become the target of the radicals for supporting the enemy. We saw this happening in the Punjab when the extremists killed Sant Longowal and, in Algeria, when the GIA let loose its terror against the Muslims who did not take part in the Jihad aimed at bringing about Islamic rule.

Amr Hamzawy (2006) argues that we should engage the moderate Islamists, who are interested in bringing about democracy in the region. But we have seen how thin the line is between moderate Islamists and the radicals. In Algeria, FIS' leadership was ambiguous on democracy and pluralism. They were sending conflicting signals. While Madani, the President of the party, spoke in terms of pluralism and democracy, Belhaj, his deputy, made it clear that taking part in the elections was only a means to achieve power, and thereafter Islamic rule would be imposed and there would be no more elections because voting against Islamic rule would tantamount to apostasy – an action punishable by death. In such a scenario, what can the moderates do? If they oppose the extremists who want Islamic rule, notwithstanding the fact that most Muslims are

opposed to Islamic rule of the kind the extremists are fighting for, they fear being labeled apostates at best, and shot by assassins at worst. Thus, Amr Hamzawy's argument that we should engage moderate Muslims, for they are craving freedom from authoritarian regimes and want democracy of the western sort, appears impractical unless conditions are created wherein the moderates can raise their voices without fear of getting killed by foot soldiers of Al Jihad, Al Qaeda or its affiliates that currently move about freely in Arab countries and in Pakistan.

We need only remember that Ghamizi in Pakistan has received many death threats despite the fact that he has given Koranic justifications for voicing his opposition to the radical Islamists in Pakistan, and asking the Mullahs to concentrate on preaching rather than politicking. And so has the exiled Egyptian cleric Ahmed Subhy Mansour, whose teachings have earned him dozens of death fatwas (Witter, 2007). Mansour, along with Abou el Fadl, want to wrestle Islam away from the Islamists who have seized control of it. However, they feel helpless in the face of the physical power of the extremists.

These moderates do not have the guns to defend themselves let alone to stand up against the extremists. Who will come to their aid? Unless the state creates conditions whereby people can express their opinions freely, it is not possible for these voices of moderation to rise above the din of bullet shots and rocket fire. The extremists may be small in number, and form but a miniscule percentage of the total population, but they constitute a dominant force with the guns in their hands. They use violence selectively but in a way that makes the indifferent majority take side with them or at least not cooperate with their enemies (McCormick, 2007)

Also how does one treat Maudoodi or Ali Belhaj who adopted legal route for pursuing radical ideas – implementation of sharia and bringing about the Islamic rule. Will the Islamists in Pakistan be satisfied with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq? Will the mujhideens surrender their arms? Not likely. Going by the rhetoric of Zawahiri and Bin laden it would only mean a clear path for them to bring back Taliban rule in Afghanistan and vigorously pursue the Talibanization of other Muslim countries, albeit with force, for most Muslims, even in Pakistan, are not in favor of the Islamic rule

of the kind Zawahiri and Bin Laden are pursuing (Finel and Gell, 2007). It is not likely that a moderate like Ghamizi would be able to persuade Mullah Fazlullah to abandon designs for Talibanesque rule in Pakistan.

Will the negotiation with Al Qaeda as suggested by Arquilla, stop the Al Qaeda and other radical groups from pursuing their radical ideas? Of course the U.S. can negotiate and seek peace with the Al Qaeda in exchange for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. But it will not solve the terrorism problems in Pakistan and Egypt. On the contrary the negotiations may exacerbate the problems, for then the Al Qaeda would be a more legitimate organization, and buoyant after having sent the Americans packing. The Muslim states are aware of the dark future if their countries are allowed to go the Taliban way. Algerian Muslims have already shown that they are not willing to accept Islamic rule, though they take pride in being an Islamic state they don't want Islamic (theocratic) rule.

Moderate voices like those of Ghamizi and Mansour will become audible if the state is able to silence the radicals, and that requires repressing the extremists as was done in Algeria and Punjab.

However, the U.S. withdrawal from the GWOT is indeed needed. The presence of the U.S. has turned a series of local insurgencies against local regimes into something broader (Kepel, 2002). Of course the counter-insurgencies in Iraq will need tremendous support by the U.S., both material and moral. Similarly, Pakistan will have to fight along with Karzai to ward off offensives from the reinvigorated Taliban. The Islamists' challenge in the Muslim countries is not monolithic. However, the presence of the U.S. as an occupying force has allowed the Islamists to join hands as a matter of tactics. This unity is bound to fall apart once the U.S. withdraws from the region. Of course, one would initially see deterioration in law and order conditions in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, but the tide would soon turn in favor of the states if they persist with the counter-insurgency measures like eliminating the radicals and negotiating with the moderates.

In a civil war the negotiation process is subject to competing perspectives as to the value of negotiations and thus maintenance of the agreement in the face of violence is a challenge that the state has to overcome (McCormick and Owen, 2004). The moderates will not be effective unless the radicals are made to run, else the radicals will never allow the moderates to speak out and reach the population whose support the extremists and the states are fighting for in an insurgency (McCormick and Giordano, 2007).

India has battled insurgencies for the past more than 50 years. Military action against the militants has been an important component of counterinsurgency operations in India. The Indian, as well as Algerian, experience has shown that sustained large military presence is a pre-requisite for creating conditions needed for negotiation. The non-military aspect of COIN operation cannot succeed without tackling the active resistance and eliminating hardliners who are averse to a negotiated settlement of the dispute (Yusuf and Mukherjee, 2007).

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